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INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS: 
THE NEGLECTED REFORM 
MARC A. RODWIN* 
I.  DRUG MANUFACTURER CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Drug manufacturers face a fundamental conflict of interest. Pursuit of 
profit compromises their impartial assessment of their drugs’ benefits and 
risks.1 Their biased evaluation can corrupt public knowledge of drugs, lead 
to marketing unsafe and/or ineffective drugs, and undermine rational 
physician prescribing.2 Over the last century, federal regulation has 
mitigated but not eliminated this problem, which corrupts drug therapy and 
medical practice.3 
 
* Marc A. Rodwin, J.D., Ph.D. Lab Fellow, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard 
University and Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Research was funded by the 
research laboratory on institutional corruption, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard 
University and a Suffolk University Law School summer research grant. Patrick O’Leary, J.D. 
candidate at Harvard Law School did a stellar job of assisting me by reviewing Congressional 
hearings on drug policy. Dr. Philip R. Lee provided helpful comments on a draft. 
 1. The conflicts of drug firms are part conflicts of interest that affect medical practice in 
general. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS; PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST (1993); MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE 
UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND JAPAN (2011) [hereinafter RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE 
FUTURE OF MEDICINE]. 
 2. Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An 
Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511 (2012) [hereinafter Rodwin, Institutional 
Corruption and Pharma]. 
 3. There is a growing literature analyzing problems with drug safety and current practices 
in pharmaceutical industry research and marketing. See generally JOHN ABRAMSON, 
OVERDO$ED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (2004); MARCIA ANGELL, 
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
(2004); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS (2004); HOWARD BRODY, HOOKED: ETHICS, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, AND THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2007); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, ATLANTIC, April 2006, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2006/04/the-drug-pushers/304714/; Marc-
André Gagnon, Corporate Influence Over Clinical Research: Considering the Alternatives, 21 
PRESCRIRE INT’L 191 (2012); MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE 
COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004); DAVID HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON (2012); Joel Lexchin, The Medical 
Profession and the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Unhealthy Alliance, 18 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 
603 (1988); DONALD W. LIGHT, THE RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2010); THOMAS J. MOORE, 
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Today, the federal government counters this conflict of interest in several 
ways. First, legislation precludes introducing drugs in interstate commerce 
unless the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) finds that the drug’s sponsor 
has demonstrated that the drug is safe and effective for a designated use.4 It 
prohibits the firm from marketing the drug for any other use. 
Second, the FDA requires that drug sponsors demonstrate safety and 
efficacy by submitting data from clinical trials on human research subjects.5 
Typically, in the trial, one group of individuals is treated with the test drug 
and a control group is treated with a placebo or an alternative drug 
therapy.6 
The FDA also oversees the conduct of clinical research used to support 
applications to market a drug referred to as new drug applications or NDAs. 
Regulations counter the risk of fraud and unreliable research. They establish 
standards for research methods, record keeping, and data reporting.7 In 
addition, the FDA inspects toxicological laboratories and facilities that 
conduct clinical trials to monitor compliance with these standards.8 
Nevertheless, the conflicts of interest persist because the firm that seeks 
to market a drug designs and controls the clinical trials used to test its safety 
and efficacy. The FDA relies upon these trials when it evaluates whether or 
not to authorize marketing the drug. An ample record reveals that drug firms 
can design clinical trials in ways that bias the conclusions.9 They can also 
misinterpret or misreport the trial data, or engage in fraud.10 
 
PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER: THE HIDDEN DANGERS IN YOUR MEDICINE CABINET (1998); RAY 
MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS (2005); Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: 
How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical 
Industry?, 4 PLOS MED. 1429 (2007). Some scholars, however, argue that that the United 
States overregulates the pharmaceutical industry. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW 
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006). 
 4. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2006). This Act, the 
FDCA, regulates the sale of drugs in interstate commerce. Id. § 355(a). In theory, a physician, 
other individual, or firm could market a drug in only one state and avoid federal regulation 
under the FDCA. For the most in depth study of the FDA, see DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION 
AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010). 
 5. 21 C.F.R. § 312.58(a) (2012). 
 6. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(a)(2). 
 7. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.57, 314.126. 
 8. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICES, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ 
EnforcementActions/BioresearchMonitoring/ucm133748.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
INFORMATION SHEET GUIDANCE FOR IRBS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: FDA 
INSPECTIONS OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS 2 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/down 
loads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126553.pdf. 
 9. Dummond Rennie, When Evidence Isn’t: Trials, Drug Companies and the FDA, 15 J.L. 
& POL’Y 991, 1007-08 (2007). See also Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, A Model for 
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Drug firm bias can slant research performed in house and also the 
clinical research conducted by external researchers that drug firms finance 
or manage. In fact, today to conduct clinical research drug firms typically 
rely mainly on researchers who are not full time company employees.11 They 
engage Contract Research Organizations (CROs) or university-based 
researchers to carry out clinical trials and/or to perform some or all of the 
analysis.12 They may also contract with specialists to design trials.13 Having 
third parties conduct the research does not eliminate corrupting influences 
for a simple reason. The drug sponsor chooses who will conduct the trials 
and these researchers depend on sponsoring firm for their income; they 
therefore have incentives to advance the goals of the drug firm that employs 
them and to follow its directives.14 In addition, these researchers report to 
the drug sponsor, not to the FDA or the equivalent regulatory authority in 
other countries.15 They cannot report their results or their analysis separately 
to governmental authorities.16 
This article explores a reform proposal that precludes bias in clinical 
trials used to test drugs. Simply stated, it removes all drug firm influence on 
the design and conduct of clinical trials used to decide whether to allow 
marketing of a drug. Recently advocated by several leaders in drug policy 
and research, this reform proposal has a long history, but was neglected for 
over half a century due to pharmaceutical industry opposition, and so the 
federal government pursued alternative strategies to counter bias, which 
proved ineffective.17 When regulation of manufacturer controlled clinical 
trials failed to eliminate bias, flawed practice, and fraud, public officials 
increased oversight relying on the same flawed approach.18 
It would not be surprising if contemporary scandals galvanize support 
for a new round of reforms. Neither would it be remarkable if responsible 
pharmaceutical industry leaders and public officials supported stricter 
 
Dissemination and Independent Analysis of Industry Data, 306 JAMA 1593, 1593-94 (2011); 
see also Marcia Angell, Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Broken System, 300 JAMA 
1069, 1069-71 (2008). 
 10. Rennie, supra note 9, at 994-96. 
 11. See Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539-40 (2000). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1541. 
 14. Id. at 1543. 
 15. See Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to 
Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 754 (2009). 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. at 712; Angell, supra note 9, at 1071; PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2-5 (1980). 
 18. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 29. 
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oversight using the same paradigm. Nor will it be unexpected when the next 
generation of halfway reforms yields only minor improvements while drug 
firms develop new means to influence clinical trials. The corruption lies at 
the root:  drug firm control over clinical trials, and so to be effective, reforms 
need to eliminate this problem.19 
A. Options for Control of Clinical Trials 
The chart below displays a typology of six key options for addressing 
conflicts of interest in clinical trials. The left end of the spectrum grants the 
drug sponsor complete control and ignores its conflict of interest. At the 
right end of the spectrum, the federal government conducts the clinical 
trials. Between these two poles are four strategies that public policy can 
employ individually or in various combinations. The FDA’s regulatory regime 
has evolved over time, but it relies on the second strategy, supplemented in 
recent years by the fourth strategy. 
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS DRUG SPONSOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST  
IN CLINICAL TRIALS 
 
Maximum Manufacturer Control Maximum Government Control 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Drug firms 
conduct 
clinical 
trials with 
little 
regulation. 
FDA 
regulates 
and 
oversees 
clinical 
trials 
conducted 
by drug 
firms. 
 
Government 
or private 
entity certifies 
clinical 
researchers. 
Drug firms 
conduct 
clinical trials 
using 
certified 
researchers. 
Government 
promotes 
transparency 
by requiring: 
 Registration 
of trials; 
 Disclosure 
of clinical 
study 
reports; or 
 Disclosure 
of patient 
level data. 
Government 
selects 
independent 
entities to 
conduct 
clinical trials. 
Government 
agency 
conducts 
clinical trials. 
 
 19. The concept of institutional corruption has been developed by Lawrence Lessig and 
Dennis Thompson. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS – 
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 226-47 (2011); Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: 
Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005); DENNIS F. 
THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION (1995). For 
a review of institutional corruption and the pharmaceutical industry, see generally Rodwin, 
Institutional Corruption and Pharma, supra note 2. Several researchers at the Edmond J. Safra 
Center, Harvard University, are analyzing institutional corruption in the pharmaceutical 
economy and other areas of public life. See The Lab at Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, 
HARVARD UNIV., http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
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The first option — really the absence of a strategy — allows the drug 
firm to conduct clinical trials without interference. It refrains from addressing 
its conflict of interest. The second strategy — the main one used today — 
has the FDA regulate and oversee clinical trials conducted by drug firms. 
The regulations set standards to promote reliable research. 
A third strategy requires that only certified research organizations and 
researchers conduct clinical trials. A fourth strategy requires transparency to 
facilitate public review of clinical trial methods, analysis, and results. Since 
2007, the United States has required registration of clinical trials to promote 
transparency.20 
A fifth strategy removes drug firm bias by having the federal government 
select independent organizations and researchers to design and conduct 
clinical trials. Researchers would not depend on drug firms to select them 
and so would lack incentives to favor the drug firm. A sixth strategy has a 
governmental institution or agency design and conduct clinical trials. 
 
 20. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 
801(a), 121 Stat. 823, 905-08 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 282 (2006)). The push for 
registration of clinical trials emerged after studies showed the presence of biased information 
in the published literature evaluating drugs, resulting from bias in the clinical studies that were 
published. See An-Wen Chan et al., Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in 
Randomized Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles, 291 JAMA 2457 (2004). 
Drug firms published studies with positive results in several forms but buried studies with results 
that showed drugs were not very effective or that they posed high risks. This led medical 
journal editors to promote registration of clinical trials to increase access to data from 
unpublished clinical trials. Id. at 2462. In 2004, the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors agreed that their journals would not publish clinical trial results unless the 
researchers had registered the trial before patients enrolled in the trial. See Kay Dickersin & 
Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA 516 (2003); Editorial, Clinical Trial 
Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250 (2004). The committee of editors decided that registries should 
include data specified by the World Health Organization. International Clinical Trials Registry 
Platform (ICTRP), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2012), http://www.who.int/ictrp/network/trds/en/ 
index.html. Current law requires registering Phase 2 and higher trials of drugs and biologicals 
on the Clinical-Trials.gov website if the trial is part of an FDA investigational new drug 
application, or if there is a trial site in the United States. Researchers must post key results 
within a year after the completion of collecting data. However, they have up to three years to 
post results for studies of off-label drug uses (i.e, uses other than those the FDA has 
approved). Nevertheless, registration practice falls short of what the law requires. Sylvain 
Mathieu et al., Comparison of Registered and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized 
Controlled Trials, 302 JAMA 977 (2009); Michael R. Law et al., Despite Law, Fewer Than 
One in Eight Completed Studies Of Drugs and Biologics are Reported on Time on 
ClinicalTrials.gov, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2338 (2011). Moreover, current law and policy impedes 
access to information on drug safety. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, 
Confidentiality Laws and Secrecy in Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on 
Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483 (2007). 
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Until now, almost all efforts to address the drug sponsor’s conflict of 
interest employed the second strategy and set standards for the conduct of 
laboratory testing and clinical trials.21 The federal government could bolster 
the second strategy with different kinds of rules. Regulations could that the 
drug sponsor’s proposed protocol and research design be reviewed by 
independent experts selected by the FDA. Based on the peer review, the FDA 
could then require that the sponsor revise the protocol and research design. 
Other regulations could oversee financial relations between the drug 
sponsor and researchers. They could preclude individuals and firms from 
conducting a trial if they have significant conflicts of interest arising from 
other financial ties with the drug company. They could also set standards for 
compensation of firms and individuals. 
Some reformers in the 1960s and 1970s advocated certification of 
researchers — the third strategy — but the United States has not pursued 
this approach.22 Regulations could require that only certified individual 
researchers and organizations conduct drug trials used to support NDAs. 
They could authorize the federal government or private organizations to 
certify researchers. Regulations could require training, experience, and other 
qualifications for certification. They could create a system to revoke 
certification from individuals and firms that engaged in misconduct or 
violated rules. They could preclude individuals and firms from conducting 
trials when they have designated conflicts of interest such as financial ties 
with pharmaceutical firms whose products they test. 
To strengthen the transparency strategy, regulations could require that 
drug sponsors and their researchers make public the clinical study report, 
which drug firms now produce to comply with international standards and 
FDA rules.23 Clinical study reports contain key information related to the 
 
 21. See Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and 
Effective? 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13561, 2007). 
 22. See, e.g., Committee on Public Health, The Importance of Clinical Testing in 
Determining the Efficacy and Safety of Drugs, 38 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 415, 433-34 (1962). 
Although the United States does not certify researchers for drug testing, the FDA can bar 
researchers from conducting clinical trials used to support new drug applications. 21 C.F.R. § 
312.70 (2012). 
 23. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR HUMAN USE, GUIDELINE FOR INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE AND 
CONTENT OF CLINICAL STUDY REPORTS; see also International Conference on Harmonisation: 
Guideline on Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports; Availability, 61 Fed. Reg. 
37,320 (July 17, 1996). John Abramson and I have called for legislation to require 
mandatory disclosure of clinical study reports for FDA approved drugs. See Marc A. Rodwin & 
John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Data as a Public Good, 308 JAMA 871 (2012). See also 
Peter Doshi et al., The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: Recommendations from the 
Tamiflu Experience, 9 PLOS MED. e1001201 (2012). Recently, the European Medicines 
Agency has started to make clinical trial reports available when they are requested under 
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clinical trial, including:  the study protocol, the designated clinical end 
points, discussion of methods and statistical analysis, tabulated data, and 
analysis of data. Regulations could also require disclosure of clinical trial 
patient level data. Making public detailed information on clinical trials 
would allow independent researchers to review the analysis or to perform 
their own evaluation. Proponents of this approach say it would make it 
harder for drug sponsors to hide risks from the public and also help hold the 
FDA accountable for its decisions.24 
New regulations that advanced the second, third, and fourth strategies 
could reduce the risk of fraud or bias and improve the design and 
implementation of clinical trials. However they would not remove the bias 
inherent in drug sponsor influence over the trials. Consequently, some critics 
have proposed ending the drug sponsor’s control over clinical trials used by 
the FDA to evaluate drugs.25 This reform can be implemented through the 
fifth strategy, having the federal government contract with independent 
organizations to design and conduct clinical trials, or through the sixth 
strategy, having the federal government conduct the clinical trials. Under 
most formulations of these proposals, the drug firm that wishes to market 
the drug pays the cost of the trials, just as they currently do. Some people, 
however, propose that the pharmaceutical industry collectively finance the 
trials;26 others propose that the federal government share the costs of testing 
a drug either with the pharmaceutical industry collectively or with the 
sponsor of the drug.27 
Governmental oversight of clinical trials is part of broader regulation of 
pharmaceutical firms to manage their conflicts of interest. To understand 
proposals to reform the conduct of clinical trials, it will help to review how 
public authorities have regulated drug firms over the last century. 
 
public disclosure statutes. See Press Release, Eur. Meds. Agency, European Medicines Agency 
Widens Public Access to Documents, (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.ema.europa. 
eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2010/11/news_detail_001158.jsp&mi
d=WC0b01ac058004d5c1 (2010). See also Peter Doshi & Tom Jefferson, The First 2 Years 
of the European Medicines Agency’s Policy on Access to Documents: Secret No Longer, 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED., Dec. 19, 2012, at E1 (reviewing data from the first 2 years of the 
EMA’s access policy and finding diversity in the requestor affiliation). 
 24. See Krumholz & Ross, supra note 9, at 1593-94. 
 25. See a discussion of contemporary proposals infra Part III. Angell, supra note 9, at 
1071; Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of 
Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 102, 111; 
ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245. 
 26. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination 
Study, Part 4: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. 
Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong. 1620 (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research and 
Regulation Hearings, Part 4]; ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245. 
 27. See infra Part II, III (discussing contemporary proposals). 
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II.  COPING WITH DRUG FIRM CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: 
A HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG REGULATION 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, there were no effective 
institutional means to control pharmaceutical firm conflicts of interest. The 
law allowed a drug market premised on laissez-faire.28 Manufacturers could 
sell directly to consumers any product and make any therapeutic claim. 
Manufacturers were not required to test their drugs for safety or efficacy, or 
even to disclose the ingredients. Many products marketed as medicines 
lacked active ingredients. Other products, sold without prescriptions and 
often without the contents being disclosed, included narcotics, alcohol, or 
other dangerous substances.29 Patients and physicians lacked the ability to 
evaluate drugs or choose among them. Firms did not engage in anything 
similar to contemporary drug development or clinical trials. 
There were two categories of drugs. The first, referred to as ethical 
drugs, were listed in the U.S. Pharmacopeia or in the National Formulary, 
and consisted of drugs that the physicians and pharmacists considered 
reliable.30 In practice, these drugs were substances that were in the public 
domain, and hence not patented, although there was no reason why an 
individual or firm that invented a new drug could not patent it.31 Multiple 
firms produced and sold them to physicians and pharmacists in a form 
ready for use.32 In addition, pharmacists and physicians often obtained the 
raw ingredients and compounded these medicines.33 Among the 
approximately 200 drugs in these formularies, about a dozen are 
considered valuable today, most notably:  morphine, digitalis, quinine, 
diphtheria antitoxin, aspirin, and ether.34 
 
 28. For a history of food and drug law and the FDA see PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING 
AMERICA’S HEALTH; THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 11-94 
(2003); see HARRY F. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, AND USE 
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 187-212, 230-32 (1970); see also TEMIN, supra note 17, at 23. 
 29. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 23-25, 32-33. 
 30. Id. at 24; James L.J Nuzzo, Independent Prescribing Authority of Advanced Practice 
Nurses: A Threat to the Public Health?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 36 (1998). 
 31. Nuzzo, supra note 30, at 36. 
 32. Id.; Glenn Sonnedecker, Contribution of the Pharmaceutical Profession Toward 
Controlling the Quality of Drugs in the Nineteenth Century, in SAFEGUARDING THE PUBLIC: 
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINAL DRUG CONTROL 97, 108 (John B. Blake ed., 1970). 
 33. Sonnedecker, supra note 32, at 99. 
 34. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 24, 59. All of these drugs, with the exception of Aspirin, 
were added to the Pharmacopeia in the early 20th century. Aspirin was added at a later date. 
UNITED STATES PHARMACOPEIAL CONVENTION, THE PHARMACOPEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 122-24, 393 (1905). Morphine was added in 1907. UNITED STATES PHARMACOPEIAL 
CONVENTION, THE PHARMACOPEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 293 (1907). 
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The second category of drugs was proprietary medicines, often referred 
to as patent medicines or secret nostrums.35 These were actually not 
patented but branded products, and the brand name was protected as a 
trademark.36 Ingredients and production methods were secret. Later analysis 
revealed that many consisted mainly of water or alcohol. Some contained 
morphine or opium.37 Firms marketed these drugs directly to consumers, 
typically through newspaper advertising, and also to pharmacies and 
physicians who resold them to patients.38 
A. The Rise of Drug Regulation 
Reform came slowly. The American Medical Association (AMA) had 
opposed the sale of patent remedies/secret nostrums since its founding in 
1847.39 The AMA Code declared it unethical for doctors to use or vouch for 
such drugs.40 Not until 1905, however, did the AMA have sufficient 
resources to cease advertising patent medicines in its medical journal and to 
institute a private system of drug regulation.41 Then, the AMA decided to 
advertise only drugs that it approved.42 It approved only drugs marketed 
exclusively to physicians that listed all active ingredients on the label but that 
did not include information that would allow patients to medicate 
themselves. The AMA analyzed these drugs to confirm that the label listed 
the contents accurately.43 
Reformers and muckrakers — supported by the AMA — spearheaded 
federal drug regulation.44 In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and 
Drug Act, which required manufacturers to disclose therapeutic ingredients 
on the drug label and prohibited the sale of adulterated, misbranded, or 
deleterious products.45 The presumption was that with accurate labeling, 
 
 35. The leading study of the proprietary medicine market prior to the 1938 FDCA is 
JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT MEDICINES 
IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION (1961). 
 36. Nuzzo, supra note 30, at 36. 
 37. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 25. 
 38. Id. at 25-26; see, e.g., Peter Temin, Technology, Regulation, and Market Structure in 
the Modern Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 BELL J. ECON. 429, 441 (1979). 
 39. Nuzzo, supra note 30, at 36. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See TEMIN, supra note 17, at 29. 
 42. For a history of the AMA regulation of drugs see DOWLING, supra note 28, at 153-
185. See also, RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 
85-90, 102-06. 
 43. Marc A. Rodwin, Drug Advertising, Continuing Medical Education, and Physician 
Prescribing: A Historical Review and Reform Proposal, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 807, 808 (2010). 
 44. See DOWLING, supra note 28, at 155-56; see also HILTS, supra note 28, at 52. 
 45. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770. For a 
review of the history and analysis of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act see Richard A. Merrill, 
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individuals could safely choose drugs. Advertising of therapeutic claims 
remained unregulated until amendments in 1912 prohibited false and 
fraudulent statements regarding the curative or therapeutic effect.46 
Despite these reforms, in 1929, proprietary medicines accounted for 
half of drug sales, and patients could purchase drugs without prescriptions, 
except for narcotics.47 At the end of the 1930s, only a handful of companies 
produced drugs that had any therapeutic value.48 They had not invested in 
or discovered these drugs and they did not conduct any research to develop 
and test new products. Henry Gadsden testified before Congress that when 
he joined Merck in 1937, “you could count the basic medicines on the 
fingers of your two hands. Our own . . . catalog did not carry a single 
exclusive prescription medicine . . . . Most of our products were sold without 
a prescription. And 43 percent of the prescription medicines were 
compounded by the pharmacist . . . .”49 
The Roosevelt administration sponsored legislation to regulate drugs in 
1933, but industry opposition blocked its enactment until a scandal 
galvanized popular support. In 1937, the Massengill Company added a 
chemical to improve the flavor of a sulfa-based drug called sulfanilamide. 
The chemical proved toxic and killed at least 106 people who ingested the 
drug.50 Congress then ended the laissez-faire drug regime by passing the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 
The legislation required firms to seek permission to market drugs in 
interstate commerce from the FDA and allowed the FDA 60 days to deny 
authorization if it found that the drug was dangerous or improperly 
labeled.51 Manufacturers no longer had unchecked authority to sell drugs.52 
 
The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996); 
see also Peter Barton Hutt, The Regulation of Drug Products by the United States Food and 
Drug Administration, in THE TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 565-601 (John P. Griffin 
& John O’Grady eds., 5th ed. 2006). 
 46. Pure Food Act Amendment of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416, 416-17. 
 47. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 38, 46. 
 48. See Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 91, 
105 (1979); see 1920s and 1930s: Salving with Science, AM. CHEM. SOC’Y (2000), 
http://www2.uah.es/farmamol/The%20Pharmaceutical%20Century/Ch2.html. 
 49. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 59. 
 50. Id. at 40-42. 
 51. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 
1052 (1938). 
 52. See TEMIN, supra note 17, at 42. The 1938 Act did not regulate drug adverting, but 
other legislation granted the Federal Trade Commission power to stop firms from making false 
claims in advertising if they could show intent to defraud or mislead. Id. 
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These changes created incentives for drug firms to conduct research and to 
evaluate their products.53 
B. 1962 FDCA Amendments Standards for Clinical Trials 
The marketing of Thalidomide led to the birth of children with severe 
deformations in multiple countries and created pressure for Congress to 
pass the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the FDCA.54 The legislation 
removed the deadline for the FDA to review marketing applications; since 
then, firms cannot market drugs unless the FDA grants approval.55 
The 1962 amendments require drug sponsors to demonstrate that drugs 
are effective, not only safe.56 It authorizes the FDA to withdraw its approval 
for drugs already on the market based on new evidence;57 manufacturers 
are required to track drug distribution to facilitate recalls of unsafe products 
and to follow FDA standards for good manufacturing practices.58 
The law restricts promotion to therapeutic uses approved by the FDA. 
Promotional materials must note risks, as well as benefits, and summarize 
side effects and contraindications.59 The FDA specifies what information the 
label must include and labels must state the generic as well as the brand 
name.60 
The law requires that manufacturers receive FDA permission to use new 
drugs in experiments before they begin tests for a NDA.61 It empowers the 
FDA to require a manufacturer to carry out follow-up safety studies after it 
grants marketing approval;62 it requires that manufacturers report to the 
FDA any information they receive on suspected adverse drug events.63 
 
 53. The 1938 Act did not state that firms had to show their drugs were effective. See 
generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 
1052 (1938). However, the FDA’s view was that in order to decide whether a drug was safe it 
needed to consider its therapeutic benefits. Temin, supra note 48, at 103-04. FDA scientists 
believed they should tolerate a higher level of risks for drugs that would alleviate a serious 
medical problem than for a drug that produced little or no therapeutic benefit. See TEMIN, 
supra note 17, 48-49. 
 54. Jerry Avorn, Learning about the Safety of Drugs – A Half-Century of Evolution, 365 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2151, 2151-52 (2011); see also Merrill, supra note 45, at 1764; HILTS, 
supra note 28, at 144-65; Hutt, supra note 45, at 569. 
 55. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104, 76 Stat. 780, 784. 
 56. Id. § 102(a). 
 57. Id. § 102(e). 
 58. Id. §§ 101, 103. 
 59. Id. § 131(a). 
 60. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §§ 112, 131, 76 Stat. 780, 790, 
791. 
 61. Id. § 103(b). 
 62. See id. § 102(d). 
 63. See id. § 102(d). 
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The law and subsequent regulations set a new standard to demonstrate 
safety and effectiveness and this created the contemporary system used to 
conduct clinical trials. These rules replaced a haphazard system of testing 
that often consisted of testimonials based on the clinical experience of 
researchers or the experience and opinions of physicians whom drug firms 
deemed to be experts. In its place, the regulations require drug firms to 
submit “substantial evidence” based on “adequate and well controlled” 
scientific experiments carried out by “experts qualified by scientific 
training.”64 The FDA worked with the pharmaceutical industry and clinical 
researchers to create standards for testing drugs, and in 1970, issued 
regulations on the conduct of clinical trials used to evaluate drugs.65 
Before beginning clinical trials, researchers identify potentially 
therapeutic molecules and conduct pre-clinical research.66 Typically they are 
guided by information and theories, which suggest that changing a 
biological process might alleviate a medical problem. Based on this 
groundwork, researchers search for molecules that affect these biological 
processes.67 They test the molecules that are the active ingredients in 
medicines in a laboratory to identify their effects on chemicals, cells, or 
tissues.68 
After the researchers identify a promising molecule, the FDA requires 
firms to test drugs, initially in animals and then in humans. First, researchers 
 
 64. Id. 
[T]he term ‘substantial evidence’ means consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training 
and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which 
it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the 
effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof. Id. 
 65. Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and 
Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250 (May 8, 1970) (codified at 
21 C.F.R. 146). For a careful study of the how clinical trials and clinical research developed, 
see HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1900-1990 (2000). 
 66. For a description and history of the process used for drug development and testing 
drugs, see SUSAN ALDRIDGE, MAGIC MOLECULES: HOW DRUGS WORK 23-52 (1998); see JÜRGEN 
DREWS, IN QUEST OF TOMORROW’S MEDICINES 71-115 (2003). For a succinct review, see 
Richard E. Rowberg, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30913, PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT: A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS (2001). See also, Science & 
Research: Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Product Regulations, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (1983), www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/ 
ucm119443.htm [hereinafter FDA, Proposed New Regulations]. 
 67. See FDA, Proposed New Regulations, supra note 66. 
 68. See PACIFIC BIOLABS, PRECLINICAL TOXICOLOGY, GUIDANCE FOR THE INDUSTRY 5-6, 20 
(1997), available at http://www.pacificbiolabs.com/downloads/booklet%20preclinical%20tox 
%20guidance.pdf. 
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test the drug in animals at various doses to identify whether it is toxic.69 They 
also may note its potential therapeutic effects.70 If a molecule is not highly 
toxic in animals, researchers can proceed to test the drug in humans in 
clinical trials divided into three phases.71 In the first phase of clinical trials 
researchers test the drug to a small number of human subjects to determine 
whether it is toxic in humans, and if so at what doses. Those studies yield 
information about what does human can tolerate the drug without 
immediate health risks. If the drug appears safe enough to continue testing, 
researchers conduct a second phase clinical trial in a larger group of 
patients to measure its benefits and risk.72 If a molecule still shows promise, 
researchers can proceed to the third phase, a controlled clinical trial that 
tests a drug’s safety and effectiveness in a larger number of human research 
subjects.73 
Phase three clinical trials evaluate a drug by comparing its use in test 
subjects with a control group. Typically, the control group uses a placebo or 
an alternative therapy.74 Protocols specify a process for randomly assigning 
subjects to test and control groups in order to preclude bias in assignment 
of individuals among the groups.75 The study must generally be double 
blind.76 That is, the medication must be coded so that neither the physician 
administering it nor the test subject knows which individuals receive the test 
drug or the placebo or standard therapy to which it is compared until the 
code is broken after collection of the data.77 The protocols must specify 
methods for making and recording observations and methods for statistical 
analysis.78 Firms must provide extensive documentation and submit raw data 
and analysis as well as the results.79 
These regulations greatly improved the quality of drug testing. It spurred 
the development of new research methods and a clinical research industry.80 
 
 69. Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.22, 312.23 (2012). 
 70. Id. § 312.23. 
 71. Id. § 312.21(a). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 312.21(c). 
 74. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a). In some situations the control group could be patients 
that receive no treatment or historical data on the progress of an illness. Id. § 
312.32(c)(1)(i)(C). 
 75. Id. § 312.23(a)(5)(iii). 
 76. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
CLINICAL TRIALS 11 (1998). 
 77. Id. 
 78. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(6)(iii)(f). 
 79. See id. § 312.23(a)(8). 
 80. Margaret Hamburg, 50 Years after Thalidomide: Why Regulation Matters, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. VOICE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2012/02/50-
years-after-thalidomide-why-regulation-matters/. 
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Market analysts estimated the CRO market to be $24 billion in 2010 and 
growing by 15%.81 Nevertheless, since the 1970 regulations went into 
effect, there have been three sorts of problems:  fraud, poor quality, and 
bias.82 Therefore, several contemporary researchers, physicians, and 
advocates contend that drug-firm control over clinical research 
compromises our knowledge and public safety. 
III.  CONTEMPORARY PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING 
In the last two decades, several authors have called for having an 
independent entity, rather than drug manufacturers, design and conduct 
clinical trials to test drugs. Dr. Marcia Angell argues that we should not 
permit drug firms to control tests of their products.83 She proposes the 
creation of an Institute for Prescription Drug Trials within the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) that would oversee the clinical trials.84 NIH would 
contract with independent researchers at universities to carry out the 
research.85 The data would belong to the institute and the researchers, and 
the results would be made public.86 Researchers would be permitted to use 
the data for publications.87 The FDA would rely on these studies to decide 
whether to authorize marketing of the drug.88 Drug firms would be assessed 
a percentage of their gross revenues to fund the institute.89 
In a similar vein, doctors Wayne Ray, Marie Griffin, and Jerry Avorn 
proposed creating a governmental center to assess drug effectiveness and 
compare the costs and benefits of alternative drug therapies.90 They argue 
 
 81. See MAYSOUN DIMACHKIE MASRI ET AL., CONTRACT RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS: AN 
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 5 (2012), available at http://www.guidestarclinical.com/whitepapers/CON 
TRACT%20RESEARCH%20ORGANIZATIONS%20AN%20INDUSTRY%20ANALYSIS.pdf (citing 
BIOPHARM RESEARCH PUBL’G, CONTRACT RESEARCH ANNUAL REVIEW 2011 (2011)). For analysis of 
the forces creating this industry, see generally Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical 
Research, HEALTH AFF., Mar. – Apr. 2000, at 129. 
 82. See Sidney Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New Drug Research: A 
Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155, 
181; see Sean R. Tunis et al., Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical 
Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1624 (2003). 
 83. ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 245, 247. 
 87. Id. at 245. 
 88. See ANGELL, supra note 3, at 246. 
 89. Id. at 245. Dr. Angell nicely summarizes problems with industry sponsored clinical 
trials in an article. See generally Angell, supra note 9. For a review of problems with industry 
funded trials, see generally Bodenheimer, supra note 11. 
 90. Wayne A. Ray et al., Evaluating Drugs After Their Approval for Clinical Use, 329 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2031 (1993). 
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that pharmaceutical-industry-sponsored studies do not answer key questions 
about risks and benefits necessary for clinicians to make therapeutic 
choices, particularly among alternative drug therapies.91 Nor do drug firms 
have incentives to study the cost effectiveness of alternative therapies.92 The 
center would fund and/or conduct studies of drugs already approved for 
sale and coordinate drug research performed by government agencies.93 
Dr. Ray and his colleagues propose to finance the center through a tax on 
drug sales and third-party payer subscription fees.94 
Dr. Drummond Rennie argues that the United States should create a 
National Institute of Clinical Trials, financed with federal funds and a budget 
separate from that of the NIH.95 The institute would decide what trials to 
conduct and make grants to researchers to carry out the studies.96 
Researchers would receive all their funds through their institutions and not 
be allowed to receive other funds.97 In a variation of this plan, doctors Lisa 
Bero and Rennie have proposed legislation to finance independent studies 
of the cost effectiveness and comparative effectiveness of drugs by having 
the FDA charge drug firms a user fee.98 
A group of scholars interested in public goods and intellectual property 
have also called for having publicly funded independent clinical trials.99 
They note that in addition to ensuring unbiased evaluation, public funding 
would reduce the cost of drug development now borne by individual 
firms.100 If clinical trials to test drugs were publicly funded, they argue, it 
would be unnecessary to grant drug firms patents or exclusive marketing 
 
 91. Id. at 2029-30. The article notes that there were several proposals for Congress to 
create a national evaluative body for drugs. Id. at 2031. FDCA amendments proposed in 
1974, 1978, and by the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use in 1980, and by Senator 
David Pryor’s proposed Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2030. 
 93. Id. at 2031. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Rennie, supra note 9, at 1010. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Lisa A. Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published Drug 
Studies, 12 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 209, 229 (1996). Several other physicians 
have called for increasing funding for clinical trials to improve pharmaceutical policy and 
clinical care. See Tunis et al., supra note 82, at 1631. Dr. A. J. Wood proposed the creation 
of an independent drug safety board to evaluate drugs. See Alastair J.J. Wood et al., Making 
Medicines Safer – The Need for an Independent Drug Safety Board, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1851, 1852 (1998). 
 99. E.g.,Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical 
Trials, ECONOMIST’S VOICE, Jan. 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Lewis et al., The Case for Public 
Funding], available at http://www.duke.edu/~ab389/PubList/LewisReichmanPDF.pdf. 
 100. Id. at 1-2. 
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periods to spur their investment, or at least we could shorten the duration of 
the monopoly.101 Drug prices would fall, which would increase access by 
individuals with low income, particularly in third-world countries, and 
improve health care globally.102 
These reform proposals are supported by scholarly literature and case 
studies that document publication bias, biased research design, and other 
problems in drug company-controlled trials. Dr. Joel Lexchin and his 
colleagues reviewed medical literature on drug-company-sponsored clinical 
trials and found that company-sponsored research was more likely to draw 
conclusions favorable to the sponsor than studies funded by other 
sources.103 Of 16 studies that examine funding sources and outcomes of 
 
 101. See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and 
Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 178 (2009); see Tracy R. Lewis et al., Univ. of Cal. 
Berkeley Law and Economics Workshop: Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good: The Most 
Logical Reform 4 (Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Lewis et al., Treating Clinical Trials as a Public 
Good], available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3cn7258n. 
 102. For discussion of public funding of clinical trials in particular, see Lewis et al., The 
Case for Public Funding, supra note 99; Lewis et al., Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good, 
supra note 101; Love & Hubbard, supra note 101, at 159, 177-79. For one of the intellectual 
leaders in the public goods approach to intellectual property and drug development, see the 
work of James Love, Director of Knowledge Ecology International. James Love, Director, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 12, 2009), http://keionline.org/jamie. For some of his key 
articles, see James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New 
Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1528-34 (2007); Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New 
Trade Framework for Global R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0147, 0150 (2004); Comment from 
James Love, Knowledge Ecology Int’l, to the Intergovernmental Working Group on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, World Health Organization, The Role of Prizes in 
Stimulating R&D (Sept. 30, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/se 
cond/contributions_section2/Section2_JamesLove-KEI_prizes.pdf; JAMES LOVE, CONSUMER 
PROJECT ON TECH., EVIDENCE REGARDING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS IN 
INNOVATIVE AND NON-INNOVATIVE MEDICINES (2003). See generally DEAN BAKER, CTR.. FOR 
ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE BENEFITS AND SAVINGS FROM PUBLICLY- FUNDED CLINICAL TRIALS 
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2008). See generally THOMAS POGGE, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., CRAWFORD 
SCH. OF PUB. POLICY, DEV. POLICY CTR., DISCUSSION PAPER #7, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MORE 
JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN GLOBAL HEALTH (2011). See generally Thomas Pogge, The Health 
Impact Fund: Boosting Pharmaceutical Innovation Without Obstructing Free Access, 18 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 78 (2009). In a similar vein, some authors have suggested 
that the data from clinical trials should be a public good, and that we should revise treaties 
and laws that confer drug companies data exclusivity from their trials for several years. See 
Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual 
Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9 
(2009). 
 103. Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and 
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167, 1167 (2003). 
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clinical trials and meta-analyses, 13 studies found that drug-company-
funded studies favored the sponsor’s product.104 
Studies may favor the sponsor’s product due to publication bias.105 Drug 
firms typically do not seek to publish studies unless it helps market their 
product.106 As a result, published literature is a biased sample of the studies 
that have been conducted.107 Indeed, sometimes drug firms even try to stop 
researchers from independently publishing articles on clinical trials that yield 
unfavorable results.108 Pharmaceutical firm funding, furthermore, also skews 
what kinds of studies are conducted. Manufacturers, notes Dr. Wayne Ray, 
“would not benefit from studies to determine whether inexpensive off-patent 
drugs or non-pharmaceutical interventions could replace profitable, single-
source products or from studies to determine the rates of adverse reactions 
to approved products.”109 
A growing literature also documents various sources of bias in trial 
outcomes including the questions posed, the study design, its methodology, 
and the way it is conducted or reported.110 Even well-designed studies may 
slant results due to flaws in how they were conducted. Researchers might not 
follow the protocol, not report all the data, incorrectly report the data, or 
fabricate the data.111 
The choice of research subjects can also skew outcomes. Individuals 
should be randomly assigned among the test and control groups and 
neither clinician nor research subject should know in which group they are 
placed. However, researchers sometimes use flawed randomization methods 
 
 104. Id. at 1168. 
 105. P.C. Gøtzsche, Multiple Publication of Reports of Drug Trials, 36 EUR. J. CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 429, 431-32 (1989); Patricia Huston & David Moher, Redundancy, 
Disaggregation, and the Integrity of Medical Research, 347 LANCET 1024, 1025 (1996); 
Martin R. Tramèr et al., Impact of Covert Duplicate Publication on Meta-Analysis: A Case 
Study, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 635, 635 (1997). 
 106. See Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 209; see Huston & Moher, supra note 105, at 
1025. 
 107. Tramèr et al., supra note 105, at 638. 
 108. Michael McCarthy, Company Sought to Block Paper’s Publication, 356 LANCET 1659, 
1659 (2000); David G. Nathan & David J. Weatherall, Academic Freedom in Clinical 
Research, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1368, 1369 (2002); Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Thyroid 
Storm, 277 JAMA 1238, 1238 (1997) (describing Boots Pharmaceuticals’ attempt to discredit 
and prevent the publication by claiming the study was flawed). 
 109. Ray et al., supra note 90, at 2030. 
 110. Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 211; P.C. Waller et al., Review of Company Post-
Marketing Surveillance Studies, 304 BRIT. MED. J. 1470, 1471 (1992); Peter C. Gøtzsche, 
Methodology and Overt and Hidden Bias in Reports of 196 Double-Blind Trials of 
Nonsteroidal Antiinflammatory Drugs in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 10 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 
31, 31-32 (1989). 
 111. Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 219, 222. 
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so patients are not actually randomly assigned or either the clinician or 
research subject knows whether the individual receives the test drug or the 
alternative.112 Also, sometimes drugs are tested on individuals who are not 
typical of patients who will use the drug; for example, they may be healthier 
than intended patients.113 
Often drug studies measure a surrogate endpoint rather than the 
desired effect. Rather than testing the extent to which a drug reduces heart 
attacks, strokes, or mortality due to coronary artery disease, for example, the 
trial measures its effect on the research subject’s cholesterol level.114 The 
presumption is that reducing blood cholesterol will decrease cardiac 
morbidity and mortality, but that might not actually be so. 
Ideally, drug trials should evaluate the drug’s effectiveness, toxicity and 
other risks, treatment costs, and its ease of use.115 In fact, they often do not 
study all these variables:  they measure effectiveness or risk, not both.116 
Frequently they do not measure how the drug’s effect varies as the dose 
changes, so we do not know the trade-offs between positive benefits and 
toxicity as the drug dose increases.117 Furthermore, many trials compare a 
drug to a placebo rather than to the standard drug therapy or other 
treatments and therefore do not help clinicians decide whether to use one 
drug rather than another, or a non-drug therapy.118 And comparative 
studies are often flawed because they do not evaluate differences in effect as 
the drug dose changes. Studies that compare two drugs with a fixed dose 
are often biased because the choice of dose favors one drug over the other, 
but the drug’s apparent superiority ends when the dose is changed.119 
IV.  THE STALLED REFORM:  PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT 
DRUG TESTING 1960-1980 
The question of how to test drugs and who should do the testing 
surfaced before Congress enacted the 1962 FDCA Amendments that 
empowered the FDA to oversee drug testing used by the firms to support 
their application to market new drugs.120 Moreover, debates over how to 
test drugs to ensure they are safe and effective persisted even after Congress 
 
 112. Id. at 216, 218. 
 113. Id. at 213. 
 114. See id. at 219. 
 115. See Tunis et al., supra note 82, at 1626-27. 
 116. Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 218. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Tunis et al., supra note 82, at 1629. 
 119. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E 10 CHOICE OF CONTROL 
GROUP AND RELATED ISSUES IN CLINICAL TRIALS 7-8 (2001). 
 120. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. 780, 781 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)). 
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enacted the 1962 FDCA Amendments. A review of United States Senate 
hearings and other documents reveals a persistent debate between 1959 
and 1980 in Congress, the FDA, and among industry and consumer 
representatives over what a drug-testing regime should look like. In hearings 
chaired by Senators Estes Kefauver (D-TN), Hubert Humphrey (D-WI), 
Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA), witnesses proposed and 
debated the merits of alternative approaches.121 
One problem noted with having drug firms test drugs was that the 
economic incentives of drug firms compromised their impartiality, biased the 
design of clinical trials, and sometimes led to fraud.122 A second problem 
noted was that testing laboratories and physician investigators performed 
shoddy work because of their lack of training and their desire to boost 
income by cutting corners.123 In order to resolve these problems, many 
observers suggested that Congress should enact legislation to prevent drug 
 
 121. Administered Prices in the Drug Industry (Antibiotics), Part 24: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. On Antitrust and Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1960) 
[hereinafter Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24]; Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975, Part 1: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. 
Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and 
Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter Preclinical and 
Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1]; Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: 
Agency Coordination Study, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l 
Org. of the S. Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug 
Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3]; Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Parts 1-
34: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 90-
96th Cong. (1967-79) [hereinafter Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Parts 
1-34]. 
 122. The FDA had noted problems with fraud, bias, and poor study design even before 
1961. See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination 
Study, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. 
Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong. 32 (1962) [hereinafter Drug Research and 
Regulation Hearings, Part 1] (statement of William S. Middleton, Chief Medical Director, 
Veterans’ Administration). See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: 
Agency Coordination Study, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l 
Org. of the S. Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong. 373, 375 (1962) [hereinafter 
Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 2] (statement of Mr. William Weiss, Bureau of 
Program Planning and Appraisal, Food and Drug Administration). 
 123. These problems were analyzed by several people. See MORTON MINTZ, THE 
THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE: A REPORT ON THE ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG 
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firms from controlling the evaluation of drugs.124 They argued that in order 
to ensure the integrity and quality of testing, the federal government should 
either perform the testing itself, or contract with independent parties to 
design and carry out the clinical trials.125 
By 1960, the FDA found that many applications for drug approval were 
based on poorly designed and implemented studies.126 FDA investigations 
and congressional hearings revealed fraud by testing laboratories, physician 
investigators, and drug firms, as well as quality problems that compromised 
the reliability of results.127 Between 1960 and 1980, the FDA developed 
regulations to address these problems.128 The standards for drug testing 
became more rigorous and FDA oversight increased, but congressional 
hearings revealed that many problems still persisted.129 
A. 1960-1961:  The Kefauver Hearings and Other Proposals for 
Independent Testing 
Senator Estes Kefauver held hearings on the pharmaceutical industry 
from 1959 to 1961. The hearing initially focused on market competition, 
but after the Thalidomide disaster they focused on drug safety issues, 
including drug testing.130 At those hearings Dr. Maxwell Finland, who was 
associate director of the Thorndike Memorial Laboratory, associate 
professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School, and a physician at the 
Boston City Hospital, testified in support of creating a system of independent 
drug testing.131 The federal government, he noted, had generously funded 
basic scientific and medical research but had neglected applied research, 
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particularly the clinical evaluation of new drugs.132 Dr. Finland recounted his 
previous efforts 
to interest the National Research Council and also the drug industry to set 
up subcommittees or panels in different medical areas for the independent 
evaluation of drugs, supported from funds provided either by the 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole, or by governmental or other nonprofit 
agencies but not tied to individual products or firms.133 
Now Dr. Finland suggested an alternative:  having the NIH set up study 
sections to evaluate drugs.134 With independent testing he argued, “the 
endorsement of inferior products that are not in the best interest of the 
public, is much less likely to occur than when the support for testing the 
product is furnished by the individual producer.”135 Dr. Finland noted that it 
would require legislation or regulation “in order to get the products tested in 
this unbiased manner before approval, licensing or certification.”136 In 
response, Senator Kefauver said that his legislation included “a suggestion 
that the efficacy of drugs should also be tested by the Food and Drug 
Administration.”137 Dr. Finland replied that it would be preferable for the 
evaluation to be carried out by an independent entity rather than FDA 
scientists, who would later have to evaluate the results of the research.138 
Dr. Finland also specified problems arising from financial dependency 
of university researchers on grants from drug firms. He said, “. . . 
departments of clinical pharmacology — should not depend on their 
continuing work . . . on funds that come from individual drugs, because it is 
obvious that some people cannot perhaps divorce their judgment from the 
sources of their support.”139 
In 1960, Alek Rozental, an economics professor at Saint Louis 
University, published his article, The Strange Ethics of the Ethical 
Pharmaceutical Industry, in Harper’s Magazine.140 Rozental explained that to 
ensure drug safety, the United States should follow the 1959 proposal of the 
Hinchliffe Committee, a blue ribbon advisory committee in the United 
Kingdom that studied drug safety and cost.141 The Hinchliffe proposal 
recommended that “all new drugs. . . . be subject to independent clinical 
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trials preferably conducted by a central organization, to be financed by the 
industry."142 Rozental contended that new drugs should be tested to 
determine if they are safe and effective, and to compare their performance 
and price to existing alternative drugs.143 He acknowledged that political 
constraints might preclude the United States from adopting a centralized 
testing agency, but suggested that there would be less opposition to 
something similar:  the creation of an independent profession of clinical 
testers akin to certified public accountants serving as independent 
auditors.144 
B. 1962-1963:  The Humphrey Hearings 
Senator Hubert Humphrey chaired hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Reorganization and International Organizations from August 1962 through 
1964.145 His hearings began after the Kefauver hearings (1959-1961), but 
before Congress passed the 1962 FDA amendments.146 The committee 
examined three important questions:  (1) What role should the federal 
government play in testing drugs or setting standards for drug testing? (2) 
Which organizations should conduct clinical tests? (3) What qualifications 
should individuals have to conduct clinical trials?147 
When the Humphrey hearings began, the FDA had not yet developed 
regulations specifying how drugs should be tested, or what evidence would 
be necessary to demonstrate safety and efficacy under the 1962 FDA 
amendments.148 The 1938 Food and Drug Act included guidelines for 
designing and conducting tests on humans. It provided that manufacturers 
had to select reliable investigators with appropriate experience to test drugs, 
in particular, “experts qualified by scientific training.”149 But the FDA 
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declined to specify criteria that qualified individuals as experts, explaining 
that it was not authorized to control the practice of medicine.150 
Prior to the 1970 regulations that implemented the 1962 amendments, 
there was little distinction between physicians and investigators. Drug firms 
would frequently give investigational drugs to a number of practitioners to 
test on their patients.151 Pharmaceutical firms would draw on the reports or 
testimonials of these physician investigators as evidence of safety when 
submitting NDAs.152 The FDA recommended that drugs be tested by 
specialists in the diseases for which that drug would be used.153 It 
recommended that firms employ several investigators, each working 
independently in different locations, to ensure a more balanced assessment 
of the drugs' effects.154 
However, drug testing was not always clearly separated from marketing. 
In 1960, Dr. Mendel C. Sheps from the University of Pittsburgh School of 
Medicine wrote, “although some . . . studies are of high quality, the 
scientific requirements for careful investigation . . . compete with high-
pressure marketing demands.”155 In fact, he continued, “the responsibility 
for arranging with physicians to make the first trials on human beings is at 
times given to detail men.”156 
At the 1963 hearings, Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD) asked FDA 
Commissioner George P. Larrick to clarify who determined whether 
investigators were experts.157 He asked, “Expertise is determined by the firm 
trying to sell the goods, rather than by the organization trying to protect the 
public health; is that right?”158 Larrick explained that although the FDA 
lacked a legal standard for expertise in testing drugs, it took investigators' 
backgrounds into account when assessing NDAs.159 It checked “whether or 
not this man who did the work [has] . . . scientific experience, education and 
whatnot . . . [that are] qualifications to do that job.”160 Draft regulations, 
Larrick noted, allowed the FDA to require companies to submit information 
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on the professional qualifications of proposed investigators, along with their 
plans for testing.161 
The hearing record included a 1962 report on the clinical testing of 
drugs by the New York Academy of Medicine, which found that many tests 
were substandard due to the shortcomings of the investigators who lacked 
training or experience in designing studies, or recording and reporting 
results.162 The New York Academy recommended that investigators should 
have training in clinical research, that pharmaceutical firms' medical 
directors should have experience in clinical testing, and that investigations 
should take place in hospitals.163 The report also noted that the FDA had 
refrained from issuing standards for clinical investigators because it did not 
want to interfere with the practice of medicine and that no other official or 
professional body had undertaken this task.164 
Regarding the respective roles of the federal government and the 
pharmaceutical industry, Dr. Burroughs Mider, Director of Laboratories and 
Clinics at the NIH, explained to Senator Karl Mundt that his understanding 
was that drug manufacturers bore primary responsibility for the research that 
supported drug development and licensing.165 Senator Mundt responded 
that this arrangement, “. . . is not quite adequate to serve the public 
interest.”166 
At the time, the FDA could not conduct any of its own clinical tests.167 
Paul L. Day, then the Scientific Director of FDA’s scientific program, reported 
that the FDA needed to engage in more basic research, noting that without 
it, the agency’s emphasis on dealing with short-term regulatory problems 
would leave it ill-prepared for future developments.168 Mr. Day said, “We 
are so busy putting out fires that we don’t have time to do any fire 
prevention.”169 The lack of a substantial FDA scientific program not only 
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corroded employee morale and retention, but also weakened the FDA, 
which needed qualified scientists to review NDAs, which were often flawed 
due to poor study design, bias, and sometimes even fraud.170 
The 1962 hearings examined the federal government’s intramural 
clinical research programs. William Middleton, Chief Medical Director of 
the Veterans’ Administration (VA) Department of Medicine and Surgery, 
informed the Committee that the VA had been conducting limited clinical 
trials in its facilities since 1947, beginning with tuberculosis drugs.171 In all, 
the VA had conducted 29 “cooperative studies” (clinical investigations).172 
Dr. Burroughs Mider reported on the intramural testing capacity of the NIH, 
including facilities for the study of approximately 420 patients, most of 
whom suffered from diseases with no known cures.173 
The New York Academy of Medicine report outlined but rejected two 
reform proposals that would have shifted responsibility from drug firms to 
the federal government. The first proposal was to establish a “national 
central office on testing . . . [that would] arrange to conduct and supervise 
the testing of all products.”174 The report argued that a national center 
would be overly bureaucratic, and would be unacceptable to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and clinicians.175 The second proposal, 
modeled on the AMA Committee on Therapeutic Trials, would establish a 
national referral agency for clinical investigators.176 The report found that 
the idea had merit, but ultimately did not support it due to the failure of the 
AMA’s earlier plan.177  
In 1963, Consumers Union, which had built its reputation as an 
independent tester of consumer products, and had long advocated for the 
enactment of food and drug safety legislation, evaluated the 1962 FDA 
amendments in its journal, Consumer Reports.178 “At the core of the 
problem” of drug safety, it said, “lies that most fundamental question:  
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namely, is it good public policy to permit the drug manufacturers to do or to 
supervise the clinical testing of their own products?”179 
The article acknowledged that the 1962 amendments authorized the 
FDA to oversee drug testing, but noted, “the drug maker remains 
responsible for drug testing.”180 It argued that since the FDA was handling 
test reports that have been “procured by the manufacturers,” the 
arrangement was an inadequate substitute for “an objective testing 
agency.”181 The article supported Senator Hubert Humphrey’s call for 
having the World Health Organization (WHO) oversee a network of drug 
evaluation centers.182 In Senate testimony, Consumers Union called for the 
creation of an independent government agency to test drugs that would 
produce all of the data that the FDA would use in deciding whether to 
approve marketing for drugs.183 It envisioned this agency as a public-private 
partnership.184 There would be no parallel testing by drug firms.185 
Dr. Charles May, professor of pediatrics at New York University School 
of Medicine, called for increasing the amount of clinical testing conducted 
by publicly funded researchers in universities and at the FDA. He proposed 
the creation of publicly funded, autonomous drug testing centers located at 
medical-school-affiliated hospitals.186 The facilities and core staff would be 
publicly funded.187 The FDA or other agencies would provide grants for 
individual research projects.188 Investigators would choose research projects 
based on scientific merit.189 
In correspondence with the Congressional Committee, several other 
physicians suggested that there should be a separation between firms 
sponsoring an application to approve a new drug and researchers testing 
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the drug.190 One idea was to have the industry pool research funds. In 
September 1962, Dr. Keith J.B. Wightman of the University of Toronto 
proposed that pharmaceutical manufacturers create and collectively fund a 
foundation that would help design studies, identify investigators and 
facilities, and publish the results.191 In April 1964, the president of the 
American Society for Clinical Investigation supported a proposal to replace 
the practice of having individual drug firms directly pay investigators.192 The 
proposal suggested instead that a board of impartial scientists, and public 
and industry representatives, should disburse payments to drug testers from 
a common fund supported by pharmaceutical firms.193 
More frequently, physicians suggested placing even greater distance 
between drug manufacturers and those who conducted clinical trials. In 
December 1963, Dr. George Baehr, Chair of the New York State Public 
Health Council, proposed conducting drug testing only in FDA-approved 
trial centers located in teaching hospitals.194 Dr. M.F. Murnaghan of the 
University of Ottawa explained that when the FDA was unsatisfied with 
manufacturer testing, it “either will have to set up facilities to check such 
testing or have the tests repeated by a neutral body at the expense of the 
manufacturer.”195 In January 1964, Dr. M. Harold Book of Kings Park State 
Hospital wrote, “the preliminary testing on human patients . . . should be 
assigned to some independent noncommercial agency and not to any 
individuals or groups who are dependent in any way for financial support on 
pharmaceutical houses . . . .”196 He suggested several options. “It might be 
a . . . branch of the Food and Drug Administration . . . a panel of experts 
chosen from universities and research institutions . . . the United Nations or 
possibly a new agency . . . .”197 In March 1964, Drs. I.H. Page and Ray W. 
Gifford, Jr. of the Cleveland Clinic concurred, stating, “We have repeatedly 
suggested that an independent agency be created to receive and administer 
funds to pay the cost of drug testing. . . .”198 
During this period, there were increasing reports of fraud in 
pharmaceutical firm — sponsored testing. In 1962, reports of harmful side 
effects from the use of MER/29 (triparanol), a drug marketed to reduce 
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blood cholesterol, led the manufacturer, William S. Merrell, a subsidiary of 
Richardson-Merrell, to stop selling the drug.199 Subsequent investigations 
found widespread fraud in the reporting of their toxicological studies.200 
Merrell’s director of biological sciences not only substituted healthy animals 
for ones that had been tested with the drug and became sick, but also 
falsified data on the dosages of the drug that animals had received, and 
their responses.201 
An FDA investigation revealed that Dr. Kathleen E. Roberts had 
fabricated at least 57 charts, which purported to indicate how patients 
responded to the drug Regimen, prescribed to help reduce weight.202 
Another investigation in 1964 revealed that Dr. Bennett A. Robin submitted 
fraudulent clinical data.203 Robin was considered a reputable researcher 
and had been involved in the testing of 45 different drugs.204 
There were also reports of bias arising from drug company sponsorships 
of drug trials. The trade press reported on “rigging” of research.205 A 1963 
editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine criticized firms that set 
unethical publication conditions, specifically, permitting publication only if 
the research produced positive results.206 
In the 1964 hearing record, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey included the 
views of professionals about how drug firms' payments to clinical 
investigators might affect the investigators' objectivity. Dr. Edward Adelson, 
of the George Washington University School of Medicine, wrote 
a drug manufacturer who is anxious to obtain data to support the value of 
one of his drugs will be tempted to choose investigators who are more likely 
to give him the data he wants. Therefore, an investigator who depends on 
drug funds for his income knows that if he hopes to get further grants it 
would be better to obtain results proving the drug he is testing is a good 
one.207 
Dr. George E. Schreiner, of Georgetown University Hospital and head of the 
American Federation for Clinical Research, indicated, “that when there is 
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direct payment from drug firms, there may be too much temptation to turn in 
a favorable report . . . .”208 
In a memo to his committee colleagues at the conclusion of the 1964 
hearings, Senator Humphrey framed key questions that the Congress faced: 
Should the auspices for present testing be changed or, more likely, 
supplemented? Should, as some sources contend, the pharmaceutical 
industry be asked by the profession to contribute to a “central pool” of funds 
to be administered by the profession and from which private laboratories 
and clinics, entirely independent of industry, could perform preclinical and 
clinical tests? Should the Food and Drug Administration be given the funds 
for a comprehensive supplementary testing program? . . . Among the 
relatively few expert observers who have submitted proposals is . . . Dr. 
[Harry] Dowling. In 1961, he wrote:  “as an aid to the clinical testing of 
drugs, the [FDA] should have funds at its disposal to finance the testing of a 
drug by an independent agency (which would usually be a medical school 
or hospital) in cases in which the Administration was not satisfied with the 
evidence submitted by the manufacturer of the drug.”209 
The implementations of the 1962 FDA amendments did not put an end 
to poor quality clinical trials or fraud. Speaking before the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association in 1966, FDA Commissioner James L. Goddard 
said 
I have been shocked at the materials that come in. In addition to the 
problem of quality, there is the problem of dishonesty in the investigational 
new drug stage[,] [including] .  .  .  the consc ious  wi thhold ing of  
unfavorable animal clinical data[,] [and] . . . [t]he deliberate choice of 
clinical investigators known to be more concerned about industry 
friendships than in developing good data . . .210 
A 1966 FDA investigation found that Dr. Leo J. Cass, a physician 
employed by the Harvard Law School Health Service, who had helped 
evaluate over 84 investigational drugs, had reported data on patients who 
had never been treated with the drug. 211 These kind of problems continued 
throughout the late 1960s. 
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During this period, FDA officials met with industry officials and 
specialists on research methodology and drug trials to develop more 
rigorous drug testing procedures.212 These efforts culminated in the FDA 
sponsoring a conference on drug testing after which the FDA promulgated 
regulations on the evidence that the FDA would require to demonstrate drug 
safety and efficacy.213 
C. 1967-1979:  The Nelson Proposal and Hearings 
Senator Gaylord Nelson chaired congressional hearings on Competitive 
Problems in the Pharmaceutical Industry from 1967 to 1979.214 The 
committee investigated clinical trials and other matters.215 It heard testimony 
from individuals proposing reforms that spanned a continuum from modest 
changes in current arrangements, to shifting the responsibility for testing 
drugs' safety and efficacy from drug firms to the federal government.216 
Other witnesses made proposals between these two poles. These included 
proposals to have an independent agency contract with independent third 
parties to perform the research.217 
During the 1968-69 hearings, several physicians advocated on behalf 
of requiring independent drug testing. Dr. Paul Lowinger, Associate 
Professor of Psychiatry at Wayne State University School of Medicine and 
Chief of Outpatient Services at the Lafayette Clinic in Detroit, Michigan, 
proposed the creation of a federal agency, separate from the FDA, funded 
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COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY: DRUG TESTING, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1972). 
 215. See generally Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Parts 1-34, supra 
note 121 (discussing issues related to clinical trials and other issues in the pharmaceutical 
industry). 
 216. See generally id. (testimony from various individuals in the industry proposing drug 
testing reform). 
 217. See id. 
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by the federal government and/or the pharmaceutical industry, to supervise 
drug research.218 The agency would test drugs, finance independent 
organizations to test drugs, or oversee drug trials.219 Investigators would 
report their findings to the agency, instead of the drug sponsor.220 Dr. Dale 
Console, former medical director of E. R. Squibb & Co., supported the idea 
of creating a central testing agency that would select investigators to 
conduct drug trials, without the drug sponsors knowing their identity.221 He 
suggested that the agency be supported by the federal government, and that 
fees be paid by drug firms.222 
In contrast, Dr. Franz Inglefinger, editor of the New England Journal of 
Medicine, testified that independent testing, overseen by a government 
agency, would reduce the risk of bias, but might not be worth the cost.223 
He thought it was probably sufficient to require drug firms to contract with 
universities to perform clinical trials.224 Universities, he said, could assume 
responsibility for the trustworthiness of the clinical research.225 He argued 
that if drug firms paid universities, rather than directly paying clinical 
researchers, improper financial influence upon investigators would be 
eliminated.226 If Congress chose to have an independent organization 
oversee these drug trials used to support applications to market drugs, Dr. 
Inglefinger suggested that the medical profession, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and the federal government should jointly manage the 
organization.227 
Dr. Donald Mainland, who coordinated research for the American 
Rheumatism Association’s Cooperating Clinics Committee, testified that it 
was current practice for the drug firm seeking marketing approval to act as 
 
 218. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 10: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select 
Comm. on Small Bus., 90th-91st Cong. 3997, 4001 (1969) [hereinafter Competitive 
Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10]. 
 219. Id. at 4001-02. 
 220. Id. at 4002; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 214, at 68-69. 
 221. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 11: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select 
Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong. 4481 (1969) [hereinafter Competitive Problems in the Drug 
Industry Hearings, Part 11]. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10, supra note 218, at 
4017, 4024-25. 
 224. Id. at 4025. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 4019. 
 227. Id. at 4024. 
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an intermediary between the FDA staff and third-party testers.228 This 
arrangement allowed drug firms to influence the trials as well as the 
communication between testers and the FDA. Dr. Mainland suggested that 
Congress, “take the evaluation of drugs entirely out of the producer's 
hands,” after the completion of toxicological testing on animals, in order to 
remove the possibility of the producer biasing the process.229 Dr. Mainland 
proposed the creation of an independent, not-for-profit drug-testing agency 
that would provide grants for research in a manner roughly analogous to 
the NIH.230 He suggested that a council of experts from universities and 
research institutions should invite senior investigators to form “working 
parties” for individual drugs.231 These “working parties” would then choose 
teams of suitable investigators to conduct the safety and efficacy studies.232 
The agency should be funded largely by the pharmaceutical industry in a 
manner that did not allow it to “influence the disposal of the money or 
interfere in any way with the trials or the results.”233 
Dr. Paul Lowinger, of Wayne State University School of Medicine, 
proposed that Congress should create a National Institute of Pharmacology, 
“to supervis[e] and approv[e] research protocols for [drug] 
investigations . . .” and require drug firms to shoulder the financial 
responsibility for clinical trials.234 Under his proposal, investigators would 
report their results to both the institute and the firm sponsoring the drug.235 
Dr. George Nichols, of Harvard Medical School, proposed the creation of a 
central agency to test drugs, jointly financed by drug firms and the federal 
government.236 He said that this arrangement would eliminate, 
“questionable practices revolving around payment to investigators . . . .”237 
Dr. William B. Bean, head of internal medicine at the University of Iowa 
College of Medicine, testified that third-party testing was not a new idea.238 
He explained that the AMA had tried to operate an independent testing 
 
 228. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 7: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select 
Comm. on Small Bus., 90th Cong. 2775, 2777 (1968) [hereinafter Competitive Problems in 
the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 7]. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 2768. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 7, supra note 228, at 2769. 
 234. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10, supra note 218, at 
4002. 
 235. Id. at 4002-03. 
 236. Id. at 3985. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. at 3916-21. 
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system, but had given up because they found it was “far too extensive and 
expensive.”239 Dr. Bean supported having drug testing conducted by, “a 
neutral judging body professionally competent, and quite independent of 
any extraneous force of financial support or any hint of obligation or 
connection with the . . . promoters of the drug.”240 He favored having 
medical schools and departments of clinical pharmacology perform drug 
testing, supervised by a central drug panel.241 In questioning Dr. Bean about 
his proposal, Senator Nelson suggested that one option to organize the 
trials would be to place independent groups in control of the process, while 
charging drug companies the costs.242 Dr. Bean concurred that in his view, 
this was “the proper direction” for reforms.243 
In 1968, the director of the NIH, Dr. James Shannon, called for having 
the NIH or another federal agency help evaluate drugs. When data that the 
FDA received from studies by manufacturers were insufficient or were 
questioned, the agency would conduct its own studies or contract with 
independent institutions to conduct studies. Dr. Harry Dowling, a leading 
authority on drug safety responded by suggesting it might be better for the 
FDA to develop in house capacity to evaluate drugs.244 
In 1971, Senator Nelson introduced legislation to create a system of 
independent third-party drug testing as part of an omnibus drug bill. He 
summarized the problem the bill sought to remedy as follows.245 
 
 239. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10, supra note 218, at 
3920. 
 240. Id. at 3919. 
 241. Id. at 3920. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See DOWLING, supra note 28, at 230-32 (commenting on the Shannon proposal 
published in NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, DRUG RESEARCH REPORTS 4 (1968)). 
 245. The bill was included as part of an omnibus drug bill, S. 2812, in the 92nd Congress. 
It was introduced as stand-alone legislation thereafter. Public Health Price Protection Act of 
1972, S. 966, 93d Cong. (1973) (a bill “[t]o amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, as amended, to provide for the establishment of a national drug testing and evaluation 
center); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Congress (1975); National 
Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 630, 95th Congress (1977); National Drug Testing and 
Evaluation Act of 1979, S.774, 96th Congress (1979). Senator Nelson testified that he 
developed his proposal with FDA officials in 1969 while chairing the “Competitive Problems” 
hearings. See Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 157. In 
addition to creating a system for independent drug testing S. 2812 would require that “in 
order for a new drug to be approved, it must be demonstrated that the new drug is safer or 
more effective than a drug already on the market. 117 CONG. REC. 39,204-09 (1971) 
(statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson). For exposition and discussion of Nelson’s third-party 
testing proposal as described in S. 966, see the hearings chaired by Senator Ted Kennedy, 
Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74: Legislation Amending the Public Health 
Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1, 5, 6, 7: Hearings on S. 
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As the law reads at present, the FDA determines the safety and efficacy of a 
drug solely on the basis of information supplied by the drug company 
making the application. The dangers involved in the dependence on drug 
firms to perform, direct, or arrange for the testing of drugs in which they 
have a financial interest is obvious . . . . [T]here is an inevitable tendency—
no matter how conscientious the firm—to emphasize the positive features 
and deemphasize the negative. Many of the people they engage to do their 
testing are equally anxious to secure additional contracts for drug testing… 
A physician who turns in unfavorable reports on the drugs he is testing may 
not have his contract renewed . . . . [S]ome firms have been guilty of 
misrepresenting, distorting, and even withholding information developed in 
their testing of drugs which might in any way retard or prevent an approval 
to market. Injury and death have resulted from such actions. 
Testing of drugs should be done by specialists who have no direct 
relationship with the manufacturer, who cannot benefit financially from the 
results, who are not motivated even subconsciously by the desire to get 
anything but the truth. We must remove the responsibility for testing drugs 
from the applicant who has a financial interest in the drug.246 
As he explained several years later, the current system is, “inherently 
defective in that the promoter and beneficiary of the product which needs to 
be licensed and marketed controls all the studies that are made to prove its 
safety and its efficacy.”247 Senator Nelson introduced the omnibus drug bill 
again in 1973, and sponsored stand-alone bills for independent drug 
testing in each Congress until he lost his re-election bid in 1980.248 
Under Nelson’s proposed legislation, the federal government would be 
responsible for all testing for NDAs and reviews of drugs.249 The federal 
government would either perform the tests, or contract with independent 
organizations to perform them.250 The legislation authorized the creation of 
 
3441 and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. On Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and the Public 
Welfare, 93d-94th Cong. (1973-74). See also Senator Nelson’s statement before the 
Kennedy subcommittee in which he outlines more than a decade of statements by the FDA 
indicating the problems of fraud and poorly designed studies were a problem of the past and 
that stronger monitoring and inspections have eliminated the problem. Preclinical and Clinical 
Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 156-60. 
 246. 117 CONG. REC. 39,204-09 (1971). 
 247. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 156. 
 248. Public Health Price Protection Act of 1972, S. 966, 93d Cong. (1973); National 
Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Congress (1975); National Drug Testing and 
Evaluation Act, S. 630, 95th Congress (1977); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act of 
1979, S.774, 96th Congress (1979). 
 249. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 1: Hearings on S. 3441 
and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. On Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 
93d Cong. 55-56 (1973) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, 
Part 1] (text of S. 966, 93d Cong. § 102 (1973)). 
 250. Id. at 56. 
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a National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center within the FDA to oversee 
intramural clinical investigations of new drugs.251 The Secretary of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) would decide whether 
the drug would be tested by the National Drug Testing and Evaluation 
Center, or by a qualified independent organization staffed by experts that 
the Secretary engaged.252 Drug companies would finance the establishment 
and maintenance of the Center, and the expenses for conducting the clinical 
trials by paying into a common fund, from which the Secretary would draw 
to pay for drug testing costs.253 The Secretary of HEW would publicize the 
“methodology, results, and conclusions of all tests and investigations.”254 
Drug sponsors could still conduct their own clinical trials, subject to 
regulation by HEW and public disclosure of the testing methods and 
results.255 
D. 1973-1980:  The Kennedy Hearings 
Senator Ted Kennedy chaired hearings entitled, Examination of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry in 1973-74,256 and hearings entitled, Preclinical 
and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry from 1975 through 
1979.257 Kennedy examined the Nelson proposal for independent drug 
testing, among other issues.258 
During the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, at the 
hearings in 1974 and 1976, Charles Edwards, HEW Assistant Secretary for 
Health, and FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt, opposed Senator 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 55-56. 
 253. Id. at 60-61. 
 254. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 1, supra note 249, at 63 
(text of S. 966, at § 102). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74: Legislation Amending the Public 
Health Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1-7: Hearings on S. 
3441 and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. On Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and the Public 
Welfare, 93d Cong. (1973-74). 
 257. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975-76, Parts 1-3: 
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare 
and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong. (1975-76); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1977-
78, Parts 4-5: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Health and Scientific Research of the S. 
Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. (1977-78); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1979: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Health and Scientific 
Research of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 96th Cong. (1979) [hereinafter Preclinical 
and Clinical Testing, 1979]. 
 258. See Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 161. 
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Nelson’s proposal to create a national drug-testing center.259 FDA 
Commissioner Schmidt acknowledged that some investigators made 
questionable decisions about their study design, controls, and reporting that 
minimized the chance of discovering toxicity.260 However, he argued, 
economic incentives and tort liability made it good business for drug firms to 
carry out proper studies.261 Further, the “professional integrity of 
toxicologists in the industry” helped to assure overall high quality 
investigations.262 Schmidt admitted that there would be no bias if the federal 
government tested drugs.263 But, he argued, having the federal government 
or independent labs perform the work would not necessarily improve the 
quality of testing.264 In order to improve the quality of drug testing, he 
announced that the FDA would create regulations for assuring “good 
laboratory practice” (GLPs) in animal testing, including the inspection of 
animal testing facilities, and auditing or reviewing any data where there is 
suspicion of falsification.265 Additionally, Schmidt said the FDA would 
consider the feasibility of instituting federal certification for testing 
laboratories.266 
 
 259. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 5: Hearings on S. 3441 
and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 
93d Cong. 2162-63, 2282-83 (1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Hearings, Part 5]. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975, Part 1: 
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare 
and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong. 24, 29-30, (1975) [hereinafter Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1]. 
Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 81-82. “Senator, you are 
assuming that we could do it better than industry, and I have some disagreement with that. I 
think the problem is not the system per se, but in the monitoring that we carry on of the 
system. We have underway at FDA, and have had for a couple of years an improved 
surveillance system of these clinical investigations that are being carried on behalf of the 
manufacturer. . . There is nothing wrong with the system. It is good, but we have over the years 
done a very poor job of surveillance, if you will, but I think first of all there is not enough talent 
to go around in terms of having the drug industry involved in clinical testing along with the 
Federal Government.” Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 5, supra at 
2163 (emphasis added). 
 260. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1, supra note 259, at 24, 29-30; 
Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 81-82. 
 261. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 92-93. 
 262. Id. at 45. 
 263. Id. at 103. 
 264. Id. at 104. 
 265. Id. at 47. 
 266. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 48. Specifically, 
see Commissioner Schmidt’s discussion of Good Laboratory Practices, id. at 47, 98-99; site 
inspection and monitoring, id. at 48, 99-100,105; and retrospective review of data id. at 48, 
100. In response to Commissioner Schmidt’s testimony, Senator Nelson argued that even with 
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Commissioner Schmidt reported that the FDA had rejected the idea of 
having the federal government conduct drug testing.267 Instituting federal 
testing was not feasible in the short term, he said, because the federal 
government lacked sufficient personnel and testing facilities.268 Moreover, 
due to the dearth of independent laboratories at the time, it was not 
possible to have independent third parties perform the testing.269 Schmidt 
also argued that it would be too costly to have the federal government 
conduct drug testing. “[T]here is no way that we can get the resources to put 
into this that drug companies do.”270 It would be hard to justify federal 
spending, he said, unless the government controlled how the resources were 
used, which would result in the government setting research priorities.271 
Furthermore, he argued, because “I believe that all monopolies, whether 
public or private, tend to stagnate, the prospect of any single institution 
gaining such control over all preclinical drug investigation troubles me.”272 
Both Commissioner Schmidt and HEW Assistant Secretary Edwards 
testified that having the FDA engage in or select firms to perform drug 
testing would mire the FDA in conflicting roles, because the FDA would 
ultimately be the party to evaluate the research performed under its aegis.273 
 
increased FDA oversight, the same problems would continue, and so there was a need for the 
reforms of drug testing that he proposed. 
What disturbs me about this presentation today is not the facts that we were presented, 
Dr. Schmidt. It is the fact that it is an old, old, old case. Dr. Goddard said the same 
thing 10, 12, 14 years ago. Dr. Ley, who succeeded Dr. Goddard, said the same 
thing. Dr. Edwards succeeded Dr. Ley and he said the same thing. Now Dr. Schmidt is 
before us laying down the same case. In 1966, the then FDA Commissioner Dr. James 
Goddard gave a speech on this issue . . . . Nothing really of significance has been 
done since then . . . . In 1969, seven years ago, I went to the FDA, and we sat down 
with the FDA employees and drafted a third party testing bill. We introduced it 7 years 
ago in 1969. We introduced it in 1971. We introduced it in 1973. We introduced it in 
1975. I have not seen a single agency thus far endorse the concept or the idea or be 
excited or interested in it . . . . So it ends up languishing here. 
He later continued, “[I] would hate to be sitting here 6 years from now with the next 
Commissioner coming in with another case so we can say, now, 14 years or 15 years have 
gone by, 16 years, instead of 10, since Goddard, who was not the first one to raise the issue.” 
Id. at 157-158. 
 267. Id. at 103. 
 268. Id. at 104. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 5, supra note 259, at 
2164-65. 
 271. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 103. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 5, supra note 259, at 
2163-65 (statement of Charles C. Edwards, Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare). 
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Edwards contended, “the public would be deprived of . . . FDA impartial 
review of clinical data.”274 Senator Nelson replied that, unlike the FDA, drug 
sponsors had an economic bias in having drugs approved.275 Commissioner 
Schmidt claimed that all that was needed to ensure reliable trials was 
increased FDA oversight, but that this required granting the FDA authority to 
issue subpoenas, examine records, and conduct investigations.276 Edwards 
said that a government center would not necessarily do a better job of 
testing drugs than drug firms, and that countering industry bias could be 
achieved through better government surveillance.277 
Both the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) and the AMA 
opposed the creation of a national drug testing and evaluation center. PMA 
president Joseph Stetler argued that the proposal incorrectly assumed, “that 
scientists will somehow be more objective if their work is done under 
government rather than private aegis.”278 He also argued that creating the 
center would lead to a “drastic slowing down of drug research.”279 Speaking 
for the AMA, Dr. James Sammons argued that operating a drug testing 
center under the FDA’s aegis would transform the FDA from a judge of 
research conducted by others, into an organization that judged its own 
research.280 Both the PMA and AMA opposed another aspect of the 
proposal, the idea that drug trials should compare the effectiveness of new 
drugs to those on the market, and that the FDA should consider 
comparative effectiveness when deciding whether to authorize the sale of a 
new drug.281 
Meanwhile, evidence continued to accrue showing that many clinical 
trials did not comply with legal requirements or clinical investigation 
norms.282 Congressional committee hearings continued to report these 
findings. The FDA investigations of G. D. Searle in the early 1970s revealed 
poor oversight, negligence and fraud in the firm's toxicological drug 
 
 274. Id. at 2163. 
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 276. Id. at 2164-65. 
 277. Id. at 2163 (“There is nothing wrong with the system . . . but we have . . . done a very 
poor job of surveillance . . . .”). 
 278. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 6: Hearings on S. 3441 
and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 
93d Cong. 2526 (1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, 
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 279. Id. at 2494. 
 280. Id. at 2545 (statement of James H. Sammons, Executive. Vice President Designate, 
American Medical Association). 
 281. Id. at 2525, 2572-73. 
 282. See Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 337-39 
(statement of Gregory J. Ahart, Director, Manpower and Welfare Division, U.S. General 
Accounting Office). 
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testing.283 The FDA found multiple examples in which the laboratory not only 
failed to conduct biopsies when it should have, but it also failed to report 
the presence of lesions discovered in animal subjects.284 
Typically, the Searle lab employed two different pathologists to examine 
tissue.285 In cases where one pathologist identified a lesion and the other 
did not, rather than report both findings or have a third pathologist review 
the slides, the lab did not report the presence of a lesion.286 The company 
did not require its reports to be signed or dated, and did not have clear 
procedures for recording important information, or for editing reported 
data.287 Sometimes, the pathologists' reports were edited in order to make 
the findings appear more favorable in terms of safety.288 The company was 
unable to account for discrepancies between its reports and the raw data.289 
In some studies, animals listed as alive were dead, and animals listed as 
dead were often listed as alive later.290 The FDA investigation found that, 
“the cumulative findings of problems within and across the studies . . . 
reveal a pattern of conduct which compromises the scientific integrity of the 
studies.”291 
An FDA survey of 155 clinical investigators between 1972 and 1974 
found that 74% did not comply with one or more legal requirements.292 
28% did not adhere to the study protocol, 23% did not keep accurate 
records of the patients' condition before, during, and after trial, and 22% 
did not retain case records.293 These kinds of problems were not new. They 
had been documented in numerous congressional hearings throughout the 
1960s and 1970s.294 
 
 283. See id. at 1, 24-129 (memorandum from Searle Investigation Task Force to Searle 
Investigation Steering Committee). 
 284. Id. at 36, 66, 76. 
 285. Id. at 118. 
 286. Id. at 69. 
 287. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 118. 
 288. Id. at 76. 
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 291. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1976, Part 3: Joint 
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 292. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 338-39; 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 84. 
 293. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 340. 
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were later published as a book on the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry. MINTZ, supra 
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At the 1976 hearings, Gregory J. Ahart, of the U.S. Government 
Accounting Office (GAO), summarized the GAO's investigation into FDA 
drug testing. The GAO concluded that there is, “a lack of assurance that the 
data which is finally submitted with the drug applications and upon which 
FDA bases its decision to approve a new drug for marketing is accurate and 
reliable.”295 
Testimonies in 1976 made clear that there were then two types of 
problems with drug testing:  first, manufacturers' bias compromised 
impartiality, and second, cost pressures lead organization that performed 
tests to cut corners and produce poor quality work.296 Having a 
governmental agency, rather than the manufacturer, select the organization 
that performs the tests would eliminate bias. However, other measures were 
needed to control for poor quality work due to economic pressures. 
Frank Rauscher, Jr. testified that the National Cancer Institute (NCI) had 
addressed both problems in ways that could serve as a model for a 
government-supervised program of independent drug testing.297 To control 
for bias, the NCI and its outside peer-review committees designed the 
research protocol.298 It awarded contracts through competitive bidding, but 
 
 295. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 335. Specifically, 
Mr. Ahart made the following points regarding the GAO’s findings. Preclinical and Clinical 
Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 335. Before 1974 there was no comprehensive 
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 298. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 150. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS 153 
only considered laboratories that had no connection to the firms 
manufacturing the drugs being tested.299 
The NCI used several strategies to counter the risk of contract 
laboratories cutting costs in ways that compromised the integrity and quality 
of testing. The NCI coded the compounds it sent for testing.300 Therefore, 
the tester did not know which chemical it was testing.301 Periodically, the 
NCI sent testing labs a compound that it knew had certain carcinogenic or 
other effects as a means of ascertaining whether the laboratory performed 
tests accurately.302 Moreover, the NCI awarded contracts to multiple 
toxicological laboratories as a means of checking the quality of the work, 
and to spur quality competition among laboratories.303 The NCI staff 
monitored the studies on a nearly day-to-day basis.304 Additionally, the NCI 
divided its testing into two separate parts, each of which could be evaluated. 
One organization performed the toxicological test and generated the data, 
while the second organization performed the data processing and statistical 
analysis.305 
Following the FDA, GAO, and Senate investigations, the FDA developed 
regulations for GLPs for drug testers.306 The FDA also created a system of 
bio-research monitoring and inspection.307 However, a 1977 study of 39 
laboratories performing toxicology studies found that their compliance with 
the GLPs varied between 32% and 98%.308 Surprisingly, university 
laboratories had worse records than the commercial laboratories.309 The 
FDA monitoring program was well in place by the time of the 1979 study of 
28 laboratories, which found that the average compliance rate with GLPs 
was only 88%.310 That study found nine examples of inaccurate reporting of 
test results from five laboratories.311 
Throughout this period, consumer advocates continued to argue that the 
government should require independent testing. For example, in 1976, Dr. 
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Sydney Wolfe, of Public Citizen’s Health Research Group (HRG), discussed 
the issue of drug testing at the Environmental Protection Agency and at the 
FDA, and argued that no amount of government surveillance could solve 
the fundamental problem of interested parties conducting or overseeing 
drug testing.312 
I think what we learn . . . is not to allow any more testing by industry or by 
companies, who owe their allegiance to industry. This has got to stop. No 
kind of surveillance of any kind over conflicted and inadequate data is 
going to improve the quality of it. The Government has to step in. It will be 
far cheaper for the Government, particularly if we use industry funds, to 
funnel out the testing money to reliable companies than to have to expend 
$25 million, as you have proposed for FDA, to catch up with lousy industry 
data.313 
FDA Commissioner Schmidt acknowledged that the relationship between 
drug firms and testing laboratories required close scrutiny, but he opposed 
the proposals that Dr. Wolfe and others advocated.314 
In 1978, Senator Kennedy expressed “serious reservations about the 
adequacy” of the FDA’s new monitoring program, and renewed his 
hearings.315 Testimony and documents revealed continued negligence and 
fraud in drug testing.316 The hearings documented examples of investigators 
fabricating data.317 Some investigators submitted case reports providing 
results for patients who had not even been research subjects for the 
investigational drug.318 Others wrote reports for laboratory work that had 
not been performed, or for human research subjects that did not exist.319 
Sometimes, investigators submitted data generated for the testing of one 
drug in place of data for an entirely different product.320 
Another theme the hearings explored concerned the dependence of 
some toxicological laboratories on drug firms for their continued operation, 
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and the employment of their staff.321 Would their dependency induce these 
labs to engage in fraud due to fear that the drug firms would not renew their 
contracts if they reported unfavorable results? Some witnesses suggested 
that drug firms instructed laboratories to fabricate data, a practice that they 
called “dry-labeling.”322 Other witnesses and senators expressed concern 
that drug testers failed to record data, or would fabricate data, in order to 
produce favorable results as a means of ensuring that drug firms would hire 
them for subsequent studies.323 
E. The Carter Administration Report on New Drug Regulation 
The administration of President Jimmy Carter also reviewed proposals to 
reform drug testing and the FDA. The final report of the Department of 
Health and Human Services Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, issued 
in 1977, discussed numerous issues, including clinical trials.324 It noted: 
One of the most troublesome aspects of the present system…is that FDA 
must rely almost exclusively on the accuracy and objectivity of industry-
generated data . . . . [B]ecause the company has a financial interest in 
successful test results, the present drug testing system contains an inherent 
bias which adversely affects the accuracy and acceptably of drug 
research.325 
The panel distinguished between the risk of fraud and manufacturer bias, 
and said that, “present safeguards against the submission of fraudulent test 
data appear inadequate to detect and minimize this type of bias.”326 It 
explained, that “[t]he most direct means of minimizing the bias in testing is 
to have research conducted by investigators who are financially independent 
of the drug sponsor.”327 
The key options, the panel concluded, were to institute “limited third-
party testing, complete government testing, or government contracting of 
testing.”328 It disfavored limited third-party testing since that would subject 
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more human subjects to tests and would be more expensive than third-party 
testing alone.329 The disadvantage of having the federal government 
conduct clinical trials, said the panel, was that it “would require that the 
government evaluate the results of its own tests . . .” and also “require a 
sizable government bureaucracy.”330 Furthermore, it reported, the “FDA 
believes that if the government were the only drug tester, it inevitably would 
begin to set research priorities and would be in the position of determining 
the directions of drug innovation.”331 In contrast, “independent 
contracting . . . would constitute a lesser regulatory intrusion . . . .”332 The 
panel, therefore, preferred a system under which “the government would be 
responsible for hiring and paying independent researchers, with the cost of 
research assessed to the sponsor,” and where “[t]he information produced 
would be given to both the pharmaceutical sponsor and the FDA for 
analysis.”333 It recommended that the FDA institute a pilot program to 
“contract with independent parties on behalf of the drug sponsor for the 
clinical testing of selected class of drugs,” and that it then “assess the 
feasibility . . . of introducing independent contract of clinical testing on a 
larger scale.”334 
F. The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 
In January 1976, a frustrated Senator Nelson complained that 
meaningful drug testing reform would never occur unless the FDA supported 
sensible legislative proposals.335 In 1978, the FDA and HEW accepted this 
challenge, and supported legislation sponsored by Senator Kennedy and 
nine other senators.336 The legislation did not propose full-scale 
independent drug testing, but it did propose reforms of the drug review 
process, and create some governmental capacity to evaluate drugs. 
The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 proposed major restructuring 
of the drug approval process.337 It also reduced FDA control over initial 
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clinical testing in humans, while increasing its oversight in the later 
phases.338 The Act increased the FDA’s role in overseeing the design and 
implementation of testing protocols, and expanded the disclosure 
requirements for clinical trial data.339 Section 132 authorized the Secretary 
to write guidelines for later phases of drug trials.340 The Secretary could 
deny applications for drug testing on numerous grounds, including when 
“[T]he proposed plan for the development of the drug product is not 
adequate to meet its stated objectives,” and when “[T]he proposed 
investigations are inadequate to meet their stated objectives.”341 
The bill created a “National Center for Clinical Pharmacology” within 
HEW, separate from the FDA, to conduct some intramural public clinical 
pharmacology research.342 The Center would publish an annual Drug 
Experience Assessment Report, based on its ongoing review and analysis of 
the use of drug products in the United States, including a qualitative analysis 
of the use of currently available drug products, and the adverse effects and 
other unanticipated reactions from such products.343 The Center’s functions 
included: 
[C]onduct[ing] and support[ing] research in clinical pharmacology and 
clinical pharmacy, including investigations (1) of the safety and effectiveness 
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of existing and new uses of drug products, (2) for the development of drug 
products for diseases and other conditions of low incidence, (3) of drug 
products of special significance or with respect to which there is substantial 
controversy as to safety and effectiveness and for which there have been 
either no or minimal investigations, and (4) to otherwise facilitate 
breakthroughs in research on drug products.344 
Several controversial provisions of the bill provoked opposition from the 
pharmaceutical industry, physicians, and some consumer advocates.345 The 
bill was never reported out of committee.346 
By October 1979, FDA regulations regarding clinical investigations had 
not been finalized, and acting FDA commissioner Sherwin Gardner was 
reciting the same old sponsor-responsibility catechism:  that the FDA neither 
could nor should oversee drug trials used for approving drugs.347 
Senator Kennedy’s 1979 hearings documented 31 cases of flawed 
clinical trials due to individual investigators engaging in fraud, falsifying 
patient records, misrepresenting medical histories of research subjects, 
violating trial protocols, and breaching numerous other FDA rules.348 Acting 
FDA Commissioner Sherwin Gardner reported that the FDA had audited 
trials to detect poor quality and fraud.349 The FDA found the bulk of 
research acceptable, but revealed that the work of some investigators 
“represent[ed] sloppy science, disregard for the rights of test subjects, and 
misrepresentations of test data.”350 To address these problems, Gardner 
reported that the FDA was exploring several options. These included 
disqualifying misbehaving investigators from conducting trials, referring 
cases of misconduct for criminal prosecution, and developing new 
regulations.351 Simultaneously, and much to Senator Kennedy’s chagrin, the 
FDA was contemplating the elimination of requirements for drug sponsors to 
check their investigators’ raw data.352 
In the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the 
United States, Senator Gaylord Nelson lost his bid for re-election to the 
Senate, and Senate majority shifted from the Democratic to the Republican 
 
 344. Id. at 228. 
 345. Id. at 956-61 (statement of Barbara Moulton, National Consumers League). 
 346. Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 Hearings, supra note 336, at 956-1015 
(statement of Barbara Moulton, National Consumers League). 
 347. Preclinical and Clinical Testing, 1979, supra note 257, at 13. 
 348. See generally id. 
 349. Id. at 9-10. 
 350. Id. at 10. 
 351. Id. at 10, 14. 
 352. Preclinical and Clinical Testing, 1979, supra note 257, at 13. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS 159 
party.353 This change ended Congressional proposals for independent drug 
testing. Discussion of independent drug testing in medical and popular 
journals then virtually ceased until the 1990s. 
V.  REVISITING PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING 
A. Alternative Approaches to Ensure the Integrity of Drug Testing 
Since the FDA promulgated regulations in 1970 that specified the 
evidence it would use to evaluate drug safety and effectiveness, it has either 
ignored or opposed proposals for independent testing. To counter problems 
of fraud, bias and poorly designed trials conducted by drug firms, it 
developed extensive regulations on how to conduct toxicological tests and 
clinical trials. It also monitored clinical research used to support NDAs. 
Nevertheless, over the last quarter century, governmental evaluations, 
studies on medical research, civil and criminal investigations, and tort suits 
have continued to reveal bias and fraud in drug-firm sponsored research. 
The FDA could increase its regulation and oversight of manufacturer-
sponsored drug testing, yet there are limits on what that can accomplish 
because such regulation does not remove the source of compromising 
influences. 
Having the federal government contract with organizations to test drugs 
would be a significant change but constitutes a more modest alteration than 
another reform proposal:  public financing of clinical trials to test drugs.354 
Proponents of public financing argue that it would curb research bias and 
fraud and ensure public access to clinical trial data, thereby improving our 
knowledge of drug risks and benefits. Even more important, they say, public 
funding could reduce spending on pharmaceuticals and increase access to 
drug therapy. Current policies grant drug firms a time-limited monopoly 
through patents and marketing exclusivity as an incentive to invest the funds 
needed to bring new drugs to market, about half of which pays to conduct 
clinical trials.355 If these clinical trials were publicly funded, the cost to drug 
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firms of bringing drugs to market would be cut in half. Consequently, 
legislation could also reduce the duration of drug patents and market 
exclusivity, and that would lower the amount that the federal government 
spends to purchase drugs for Medicare, Medicaid, the Veteran’s 
Administration and the Department of Defense. Those savings could pay for 
the cost of funding the clinical trials.356 
Despite the significant potential benefits of publicly funded trials, 
Congress is unlikely to enact this reform in the short term because it would 
require major changes in financing and patent policy. In contrast, 
independent drug testing would also improve the integrity of research and 
ensure public access to clinical trial data without the federal government 
incurring up-front expenses or changes in intellectual property law, making it 
an easier reform to enact. 
B. Assessing the Arguments Against Independent Testing 
Let us review the key arguments used to oppose proposals for 
independent drug testing. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, opponents argued that independent drug 
testing was not feasible because there were insufficient independent private 
organizations to conduct toxicological tests and clinical trials, and the 
federal government also lacked the capacity to perform this work.357 These 
assertions assumed that private firms and the federal government could not 
expand their capacities to meet new demands. That was probably not 
correct in the early 1960s and 1970s, and it is certainly not true now. 
Today, rather than test drugs in-house, drug firms contract out this work to 
third parties. Initially, universities performed most of this research but over 
the last quarter century drug firms shifted most of their clinical trials to for-
profit CROs, which now constitute a global industry.358 However, testing by 
third parties is not independent today. The drug manufacturer either designs 
the clinical trial or directs and oversees researchers who do, and it selects 
the organization that conducts the research. Contract researchers, whether 
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in CROs or universities, depend on the drug manufacturer for their income 
and must follow its directions if they want to receive contracts in the future. 
Public policy could promote the independence of existing contract 
research organizations and universities if a governmental agency selected 
the entity that performed the clinical trials and monitored its work, either 
directly or through an intermediary. Furthermore, by allocating funds for the 
research, the agency could spur the growth of organizations that met high 
standards for integrity, excellence, and independence. Through contracts, it 
could encourage the growth of organizations such as the internationally 
recognized Mario Negri Pharmacological Institute, which has performed 
independent clinical trials in Europe for nearly 50 years, published more 
than 13,000 original scientific papers in scientific journals and now 
conducts about 80 clinical trials a year.359 
Independent testing, its opponents also argued, would not ensure that 
clinical trials were well designed, free of methodological flaws, or conducted 
competently. Even if a governmental agency selected the researchers, 
opponents argued, researchers might perform sloppy work or engage in 
fraud. They suggested that it was therefore not important or valuable to 
ensure independent testing.360 No doubt, independent testing does not 
guarantee that drug evaluation will be performed well. However, that only 
shows that independence is not sufficient to ensure accurate drug testing. It 
does not show that independence is not an important factor or a necessary 
condition for accurate drug testing. Moreover, the National Cancer 
Institute’s experience in contracting with laboratories to test chemicals 
demonstrates that regulators can monitor and control the quality of 
contracted testing.361 
Opponents also claimed that having the federal government test drugs 
would create a conflict of interest that would compromise FDA drug 
approval decisions because the government would then both conduct 
clinical trials and evaluate those trials when it decided whether or not to 
grant marketing approval. The federal government should not conduct 
clinical trials, they argued, because it should not be in the position of 
evaluating its own work.362 
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There is irony in opposing government drug testing on the grounds that 
it is mired by conflicts of interest. The impetus for government-sponsored 
testing — performed either by public employees or through contracts with 
researchers in the private sector — is to remove the conflict of interest 
present when a firm evaluates its products. The issue, therefore, is whether 
government-sponsored testing creates more or less bias than when drug 
firms test their own products. Drug manufacturers have a systemic bias in 
favor of their products while governmental agencies do not have a systemic 
bias in favor of or against any particular product. Certainly, some individual 
governmental personnel might harbor a bias toward a firm or a product. But 
that is unlikely to systematically slant all testing. 
Granted, a governmental agency that conducts clinical trials may not 
objectively evaluate its own trials. However, government testing is possible 
without having the same agency both conduct clinical trials and evaluate the 
quality of those trials. Simply have one governmental agency conduct 
clinical trials and designate another agency to evaluate the research. The 
NIH could conduct clinical trials and the FDA could evaluate those trials, 
just as it currently evaluates clinical trials conducted by drug firms. In fact, 
government agencies frequently evaluate the work of other government 
programs. For example, the Government Accountability Office provides 
independent evaluation of federal programs. And the Congressional 
Research Service provides impartial evaluations of legislative proposals and 
legislative history. Furthermore, it is easy to eliminate the problem of having 
government agencies evaluate the work of government employees. Simply 
have the governmental agency evaluate clinical trials performed by private 
contractors. Most of the proposals for independent drug testing, in fact, 
have the FDA evaluate research conducted by private contractors and they 
also have a separate agency select the contract researchers. 
Another drawback of independent testing, opponents claim, is that it 
would further slow the introduction of new drugs. This assertion is 
unpersuasive. Currently it requires about 15 years from the beginning of 
drug development until a drug can be tested and marketed.363 Phase I 
clinical trials in humans take about a year and a half.364 Phase II clinical 
trials typically take two years;365 and phase III clinical trials take three to five 
years. Review by the FDA can take up to two years but in recent years the 
FDA drug review, on average, has been completed in just over a year.366 
Independent testing is unlikely to cause much delay and there are ways to 
take care of problems any delay would cause for manufacturers. 
 
 363. ROWBERG, supra note 66, at 9. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. at 10. 
 366. Id. at 14. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS 163 
In principle, it should not take longer for contract researchers to conduct 
a clinical trial merely because a governmental agency hires it, rather than a 
drug firm. It might take a governmental agency longer than a drug firm to 
select which researchers to employ, but not much. And if ensuring that 
clinical trials are better designed and methodologically sound extends the 
time to develop the research protocol, that would be time well spent. 
Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman Act already extends for up to five years the 
period of market exclusivity for manufacturers of new drugs to compensate 
them for part of the time it takes to conduct clinical trials and for the FDA to 
review NDAs.367 Regulations could increase the period of market exclusivity 
to account for any increased time taken to conduct clinical trials using the 
new process. 
C. Challenges to Controlling Private Research Organization Conflicts of 
Interest 
Having a government agency select the private organizations that 
conduct clinical trials would not necessarily remove all conflicts of interest. 
Presumably CROs or universities might earn only part of their income from 
federal government contracts and, therefore, they might also earn most of 
their income from work from drug manufacturers. If organizations selected 
by government agencies depended on receiving discretionary contracts from 
drug manufacturers for most of their income, such dependence would 
create a significant conflict of interest.368 The drug manufacturer could 
retaliate against researchers that produced negative evaluations of their 
products for government-sponsored testing by ceasing to employ them in 
the future. The risk of losing contracts from drug manufacturers could lead 
researchers and research organizations to conduct their government testing 
in ways that favored the manufacturer of drugs they test. 
The simplest and most effective way to address this problem is to 
prohibit all firms and organizations that accept federal contracts for drug 
evaluation from performing any direct work for drug manufacturers. 
However, fewer research organizations could thrive without doing any work 
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for drug firms and so adopting that rule would reduce the pool of 
organizations willing to accept federal drug testing contracts. With fewer 
research organizations from which to choose, the federal government might 
have more difficulty finding organizations capable of performing high quality 
work. 
An alternative strategy is to reduce the prevalence of conflicts of interest 
rather than preclude them. The agency awarding drug evaluation contracts 
could offer work only to CROs that earned 40 percent or less of their 
revenue from drug manufacturers. Regulations could also direct the agency 
to give preference in awarding contracts to organizations that received ten 
percent or less of their revenue from drug manufacturers, when such 
organizations were available and well qualified. 
To further reduce the risk from conflicts of interest and improve the 
quality of clinical trials, the federal government could also contract with 
experts to evaluate the proposed research design and protocol before 
authorizing the start of the clinical trial. It probably makes sense to require 
public disclosure of the proposed research protocol and the comments of 
experts that evaluated it and to allow the public to comment on the 
proposed research protocol. Based on the expert evaluation and public 
comment, the government agency could ask the research organization to 
revise its trial design and research protocol. 
D. Implementing Independent Drug Testing:  Begin with New Drugs 
We can distinguish three categories of drug trials:  (1) those used to 
support an application to market a new drug; (2) post-marketing trials 
required by the FDA as a condition for granting marketing approval; (3) 
other post marketing approval trials not required by the FDA. Independent 
testing could be used for all three categories, but reform should start with 
independent testing to support NDAs. 
Federal law already requires that drug companies submit evidence on 
drug safety and effectiveness when they seek approval to market a new 
drug. Moreover, FDA regulations specify how drug firms must conduct these 
trials. Since the FDA already sets standards for clinical trials used for drug 
approval, it probably has authority to promulgate regulations that require 
such clinical trials be designed and conducted by an independent 
organization selected and supervised by a federal agency. In any event, 
Congress could implement this policy by amending the FDCA without 
regulating other clinical trials for drugs. 
The FDA also has jurisdiction over certain post-marketing trials because 
FDA regulations require that drug manufacturers monitor the risks of drugs 
they market. Manufacturers must submit to the FDA results from their post-
marketing trials but often the FDA does not specify what manufacturers must 
do to fulfill their post-marketing commitments. Sometimes, however, the 
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FDA specifies the kind of post-marketing trial that a drug manufacturer must 
perform, particularly if the NDA revealed evidence of potential serious drug 
risks.369 
In principle, the FDA or Congress could require that drug firms finance 
independent clinical trials for these post-marketing studies. However, 
ensuring that these trials are carried out would require an expansion of FDA 
authority. Until enactment of the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act of 2007, the FDA lacked authority to compel drug firms to 
conduct post-marketing studies of approved drugs.370 Drug firms often did 
not complete or delayed conducting these studies.371 One reason for this is 
that the FDA lacks the ability to routinely stop a manufacturer from 
marketing an approved drug. In contrast, regulatory authorities in the 
European Union have such power because authorization to market a new 
drug expires after five years unless the European Medicine Agency approves 
a renewal application.372 
Drug firms also conduct clinical trials for approved drugs that are not 
require by the FDA. Typically they conduct such studies to help market their 
products. They may design these trials to demonstrate that a drug is more 
effective, safer, or more cost-effective than competing drugs or non-drug 
therapies, or to explore an approved drug’s potential benefits for new uses. 
It will be much harder to require that these trials be funded by drug firms but 
conducted independently. 
The federal government lacks leverage to require independent testing 
for these studies because federal law does not require drug manufacturers 
to supply the FDA evidence that these studies are designed to produce. 
Manufacturers therefore have the option of not funding such clinical trials 
and that makes it harder for the FDA to regulate how such studies must be 
conducted. If Congress wants independent clinical trials to evaluate the 
comparative efficacy of approved drugs it will probably have to finance 
these studies. Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation that requires 
manufacturers to submit such data to the FDA, which would then give the 
FDA jurisdiction over such research. 
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